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AN ESSAY ON INDEPENDENCE, 
INTERDEPENDENCE, AND THE 
SURETYSHIP PRINCIPLE 
Peter A. Alces* 
In this article, Professor Peter A. Alces investigates the tension 
that exists between the independent and interdependent nature of 
contractual relations arising in suretyship agreements and letter of 
credit transactions. This discussion is particularly timely as the 
American Law Institute is currently revising both the Restatement of 
the Law of Suretyship and Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, '2etters of Credit. " This article discerns a basic incongruity 
between the two revisions' treatment of interrelated multiple party 
rights and discusses the consequences that this incongruity can be ex-
pected to have upon commercial transactions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"Third parties" confound the commercial law, in terms of both its 
contract and tort elements.1 The neat consensual (contract)/ 
nonconsensual (tort) continuum devolves into a tension delimited by pol-
icies and, often, conjured by power.2 In a unique way, the resolution of 
• Professor of Law, Marshall- Wythe School of Law, The College of William and Mary. B.A. 
1977, Lafayette; J.D. 1980, University of Illinois. I am a member of the American Law Institute, an 
Adviser to the Restatement of Suretyship, and have taken part in deliberations of the American Bar 
Association concerning revision of Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The opinions urged 
here are mine alone and are not to be attributed to either the Institute or the Association. I am 
grateful for the very careful and thorough research assistance provided by Rachel M Gluckman, J.D. 
1993, The College of William and Mary. 
1. This challenge was noted with regard to the drafting of original Uniform Commercial Code 
Article 4, "Bank Deposits and Collections." See Walter D. Malcolm, Article 4- A Battle with 
Complexity, 1952 WIS. L. REv. 265, 272 ("Difficulties in framing the rules governing the process 
arise from the almost infinite number of combinations of parties and facts .. .. "). 
2. See Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be 
Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334, 362 (1952) ("In fact, this Article [Article 4) is so one-sidedly drawn in 
favor of the banking interests that any banker who insisted on exercising the rights given him by this 
'Code' would probably be under suspicion by the better business bureau."); Grant Gilmore, The 
Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364, 376-77 (1952) ("[An] 
efficient collection system is in the private interest of banks as much as it is in the public interest of 
customers of banks .. . . Section 4-103 goes far beyond what is wise or permissible in allowing banks 
to rewrite the law their way whenever things get tough .... "); see also Edward Rubin, Efficiency, 
Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REv. 551 (1991) (describing how 
pressure from financial institutions during the drafting process skewed the balance among the rights 
of parties to negotiable instruments transactions within the scope of revised Articles 3 and 4 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code). 
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third-party problems implicates contextual equities, not merely the im-
manent justice of the instant controversy. 3 Apply that perspective to this 
generic hypothetical: 
Three parties, A, B, and C, agree that C will provide goods or serv-
ices to B. B will pay C in return therefor. In the event B does not 
pay C when the time for payment arrives, A will pay C the amount 
due. 
Does that scenario describe one contract, to which all three transactors 
are party? Or does it describe three separate contracts, one between C 
and B (the sale itself), another between A and C (A's promise to pay C if 
B does not), and a third between A and B (B's promise to make A whole 
in the event A is called upon to pay C)? Further, if the hypothetical does 
contemplate three contracts, are they independent or interdependent? 
Should that characterization issue determine substantive consequences? 
These questions are the focus of this essay. They are also the focus of 
two important contemporary commercial law initiatives. 
Seldom in the law is there the opportunity to observe and appraise 
the application and elaboration of principle in parallel contexts at the 
instant of their formulation. Recent developments in the commercial law 
provide just such an opportunity with the coincident Restatement of 
Suretyship 4 and revision of Uniform Commercial Code Article 5, "Let-
ters of Credit"s projects. 6 The two efforts are poised on the same preci-
pice of principle: the interrelation of multiple party rights. 
Because the challenges confronting the architects of statutory provi-
3. William Twining discusses Karl Llewellyn's invocation of situation sense in WILLIAM 
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 219-21 (1973). For an example of 
Llewellyn's invocation of the concept in the Uniform Commercial Code, see the official comment to 
U.C.C. § 2-612 (1990) ("'Installment Contract'; Breach"): 
Even where a clause speaks of "a separate contract for all purposes," a commercial reading of 
the language under the section on good faith and commercial standards requires that the single-
ness of the document and the negotiation, together with the sense of the situation, prevail over 
any uncommercial and legalistic interpretation. 
U.C.C. § 2-612 cmt. 3 (emphasis added). 
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP (Tent. Draft No. l, 1992) (hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT OF SURETYSHIP]. The goal of the Restatement of Suretyship is to "formulate rules broad 
enough to govern a wide variety of transactions that are subject to very different practice conven-
tions, yet to maintain clarity." I d. at foreword ix-x. The Restatement of Suretyship is sponsored by 
the American Law Institute and the Reporter is Neil B. Cohen of Brooklyn Law School, Brooklyn, 
New York. 
5. The Revision of Article 5 is a project co-sponsored by the American Law Institute and the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The Draft Revision cited in this 
essay is "Members Consultative Group Draft No. I" (Sept. 1, 1992). The Reporter is James J. 
White of the University of Michigan School of Law, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Citations to current 
Article 5 are to the 1990 Official Text. 
6. Two representatives of the American Law Institute serve on the Article 5 revision Drafting 
Committee, Messrs. John P. Burton, ofSante Fe, New Mexico, and Edwin Huddleson Ill, of Wash-
ington, D.C. Four other members of the Drafting Committee are also members of the American 
Law Institute: Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., of Vienna, Virginia, the Chair; Marion W. Benfield, Jr., of 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina; The Honorable William C. Hillman, of Boston, Massachusetts; and 
Frederick H. Miller, of Norman, Oklahoma, the Executive Director of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 
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sions and common law rules are substantial, perfect congruence among 
the animating principles in parallel commercial contexts is an objective 
never realized, a grasp frustrating the reach. The objective is worthwhile 
nonetheless, like the coxswain's recitation of the rhythm. The symmetry 
is allusive but should not therefore lose its allure. This essay describes 
the resistance to symmetry in the commercial suretyship law and posits a 
useful perspective with potential applications beyond the focus of the in-
stant inquiry. 
A. Suretyship 
Suretyship law orders the interdependent rights and liabilities of 
three parties inter se: the "Principal Obligor" (debtor), the "Obligee" 
(creditor), and the "Secondary Obligor" (surety or guarantor). The es-
sence of suretyship is the promise ~o answer for the duty of another.' If 
the principal obligor does not discharge her duty to the obligee, the sec-
ondary obligor will. But that statement, succinct as ·it is and sufficient to 
impart the sense of the suretyship situation, is at the same time both 
under-inclusive and over-inclusive. 
Scope issues arise in suretyship cases because the ·term suretyship 
can mean two different things. First, it may refer to the suretyship rela-
tionship, which recognizes a tripartite, interdependent agreement that 
there is a performance due to the creditor and that one rather than the 
·other of the two remaining parties should perform. Second, the surety-
ship label may be alternatively used to describe those transactions in 
which a party who performs will have rights against one or more of the 
other parties to the transaction. 8 
Suretyship, then, is both a label describing the rights of "related" 
contracting parties and a term used to describe the transactions to which 
those rights generally adhere. To oversimplify for the moment, all sure-
tyship transactions give rise to suretyship rights. However, not all con-
texts in which suretyship rights might be discovered are traditionally 
conceived as suretyship transactions. The temptation is great, nonethe-
less, to infer the existence of a suretyship transaction from the implica-
tion of suretyship rights. 
The potential for confusion is further exacerbated by the fact that in 
many suretyship transactions the suretyship rights of the parties may be 
adjusted by the terms of their contract. That adjustment often takes the 
form of the secondary obligor's waiver of certain rights and defenses. 9 
7. Common statutes of frauds use this same terminology. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 112 (1979), which states: 
A contract is not within the Statute of Frauds as a contract to answer for the duty of another 
unless the promisee is an obligee of the other's duty, the promisor is a surety for the other, and 
the promisee knows or has reason to know of the suretyship relation. 
8. See RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 4, §§ 13-14. 
9. See 2 PETER A. ALCES ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TRANSACTION GUIDE 
ANALYSIS AND FORMS§ 16.24 8 (1988): 
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At some point, arguably reached in more cases than not, the suretyship 
label becomes more misleading than helpful. 
B. Standby Credits 
Letters of credit are governed by Article 5 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. 10 In the prototypical standby, or guaranty, letter of credit, 11 
there are three parties12: the "Issuer," the "Account Party,"13 and the 
"Beneficiary" of the credit. 14 Letter of credit rules, both statutory15 and 
Guarantors waive any right to require Bank to (a) proceed against Borrowers; (b) proceed 
against or exhaust any security held from Borrowers; or (c) pursue any other remedy in Bank's 
power whatsoever. Guarantors waive any defense arising by reason of any disability or other 
defense of Borrowers or by reason of the cessation from any cause whatsoever of the liability of 
Borrowers. Until all indebtedness of Borrowers to Bank shall have been paid in full, even 
though such indebtedness is in excess of Guarantors' liability hereunder, Guarantors shall have 
no right of subrogation, and waive any right to enforce any remedy which Bank now has or may 
hereafter have against Borrowers, and waive any benefit of, and any right to participate in any 
security now or hereafter held by Bank. Bank may foreclose, either by judicial foreclosure or by 
exercise of power of sale, any deed of trust securing the indebtedness, and, even though the 
foreclosure may destroy or diminish Guarantors' rights against Borrowers, Guarantors shall be 
liable to Bank for any part of the indebtedness remaining unpaid after the foreclosure. Guaran-
tors waive all presentments, demands for performance, notices of nonperformance, protests, 
notices of protest, notices of dishonor, and notices of acceptance of this guaranty and of the 
existence, creation, or incurring of new or additional indebtedness. 
10. See JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT 1J 4.04 (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 
1992), which notes: 
The Uniform Customs [promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce) address with 
particularity such matters as communications among issuing, confirming, advising, and negoti-
ating banks; the form of the credit; the conformity of the accompanying documents; and the 
issuing bank's duty in connection with those documents. The Customs also contain a number 
of miscellaneous provisions codifying date and amount rules and also deal with the question of 
transferring the credit or its proceeds. 
11. See Werner Blau & Joachim Jedzig, Bank Guarantees to Pay Upon First Written Demand 
in German Courts, 23 INT'L LAW. 725, 725-26 (1989) ("By their legal nature, Guarantees to pay 
upon first written demand are abstract promissory notes of a bank .... [A] Guarantee is similar to a 
documentary letter of credit, except that, ... in the case of a Guarantee the documents are replaced 
by a unilateral statement of the beneficiary."). 
12. Additional banks may become involved if they "advise" or "confirm" the credit. The dis-
tinction between advising and confirming banks is in the responsibility and liability assumed by each: 
the confirming bank undertakes the same responsibilities as the issuer while the advising bank 
merely acts as a conduit for the presentation of the requisite documents. See U.C.C. § 5-103(l)(e) 
(1990) (defining advising bank as "a bank which gives notification of the issuance of a credit by 
another bank") and§ 5-103(l)(t) (defining confirming bank as "a bank which engages either that it 
will itself honor a credit already issued by another bank or that such a credit will be honored by the 
issuer or a third bank."). 
13. The draft Revision of Article 5 replaces the term account party with the term applicant, 
defined as "a person who requests an issuer to issue a letter of credit for that person's account, or a 
person for whose account a letter of credit is issued." U.C.C. § 5-l03(a)(2) (Proposed Official Draft 
1992). Comment 3 to the section explains that the change was made to conform Article 5 with the 
Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits. 
14. A typical "commercial" letter of credit arrangement might take the following form: 
A (Account Party) wishes to purchase sugar from B (Beneficiary) by utilizing a letter of credit 
issued by /bank (Issuer). A applies to /bank for the letter of credit in favor of B. After B ships 
the sugar to A, B will tender documents showing performance to /bank in return for payment. 
A will then reimburse /bank for the amount paid to B at a later date. 
15. U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1990) provides that "[a)n issuer must honor a draft or demand for 
payment which complies with the terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether the goods or 
documents conform to the underlying contract for sale." See also UNIFORM CuSTOMS AND PRAC· 
TICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS art. 4 (1983) (emphasizing that "[i)n credit operations all parties 
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common law, 16 endeavor to maintain that the device gives rise to three 
independent two·party contracts rather than one interdependent three-
party contract. First, there is the contract between the account party and 
the beneficiary, often respectively the seller and the buyer of goods in an 
international transaction, 17 referred to as the "underlying contract." 
Second, there is the contract designated the application for the letter of 
credit between the issuer (generally a financial institution 18) and the ac-
count party. Finally, there is the contract between the issuer and the 
beneficiary of the letter of credit, the "credit" itself. 
The expectation of the parties to the standby credit is that there will 
never be a draw, that the beneficiary will not demand that the issuer 
disburse the funds represented by the credit. The credit looks like per-
formance insurance. 19 If the account party does not perform as it is con-
tractually obligated to perform, the beneficiary will have the right to 
make a demand on the issuer.20 Once the beneficiary makes that de-
mand, the issuer must pay, whether or not the beneficiary is in fact enti-
tled to the payment, even if the beneficiary's demand is fraudulent. The 
issuer's obligation is independent of the beneficiary's performance of the 
underlying contract. If the account party's fraud allegation were to re-
concerned deal in documents, and not in goods, services and/or other performances to which the 
documents may relate"). 
16. See Berman v. LeBeau Inter-America, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 156, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (hold-
ing that letters of credit created an irrevocable obligation to pay them even if the conveyances made 
to collateralize the letters of credit were fraudulent conveyances); West Va. Housing Dev. Fund v. 
Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (W.O. Pa. 1976) ("[T)he performance ofthe underlying contract was 
irrelevant to the Bank's obligations under the letter of credit"); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford 
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 378 A.2d 562, 565 (Conn. 1977) ("'Except insofar as expressly incorpo-
rated therein, the bank's contract with its customer for the Letter of Credit is separate and distinct 
from the contract which exists between the creditor and the customer/borrower.'" (quoting Chase 
Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 394 F. Supp. 352, 355 (W.O. Pa. 1975))). 
17. This arrangement, of course, reverses the posture of the transactors in a commercial credit 
where the buyer is the beneficiary and the seller is the account party. The difference reflects the 
different risks that the two devices are designed to address. 
18. See U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(c) (1990) ("An 'issuer' is a bank or other person issuing a credit.") 
and U.C.C. § 5-l03(a)(9) (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (" 'Issuer' means a bank or other person 
issuing a letter of credit."). 
19. See Henry Harfield, Code Treatments of Letters of Credit, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 92, 93 (1964): 
A letter of credit always serves as a guaranty. This does not mean that it is a guaranty. A 
letter of credit is an identical twin to a guaranty, but the fact that the two things look alike and 
may be used for the same purpose and are difficult to distinguish one from the other, does not 
mean that they are the same thing and does not mean that there are not differences, which, 
however subtle, are of major importance. 
The fact that there may be substantial differences between the transactional function of a guaranty 
and a letter of credit does not mean that both guaranties and credits are not in the nature of 
suretyship. 
20. See DOLAN, supra note 10, 11 1.07[2]. Professor Dolan points out that this demand may 
take one of several forms: no documentation may be necessary at all, see, e.g., Baker v. National 
Boulevard Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D. Ill. 1975); the beneficiary may have to supply a certificate 
to the effect that the account party has not performed, see, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 
550 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1977); the beneficiary may present a statement that the account party has 
defaulted on a promissory note, see, e.g., Postal v. Smith (In re Marine Distribs., Inc.), 522 F.2d 791 
(9th Cir. 1975); the beneficiary may have to do no more than assert that the sum is due, see, e.g., 
Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 336 A.2d 316 (Pa. 1975). /d. 
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lieve the issuer of the duty to pay, the independence of the credit would 
be undermined. Once this independence is compromised, once the law 
relates the issuer's performance to the performance of either of the other 
two contracts, the commercial utility of the credit device, so the argu· 
ment goes, is eviscerated. 21 
The advocates of strict independence in the standby context point 
out that commercial transactors who do not want to confront the poten· 
tial harshness, or at least the inflexibility, of independence, can use a 
guaranty agreement rather than a standby to assure the account 
party /primary obligor's performance of the underlying agreement with 
the beneficiary/creditor; the standby is a "commercial specialty" and 
should not be impaired by courts bent on doing some equity irrespective 
of the bigger picture. 22 Issuers of such credits also are generally in sym· 
pathy with that view and for good commercial reason. 23 Distinguishing 
the standby which is independent from the underlying transaction, from 
the interdependent guaranty increases the options available to commer· 
cial transactors; ignoring the distinction between two·party (standby 
credits) and three·party (guaranty) relationships may be inimic:d to the 
interests of commerce. 
C Irreconciliation 
Appreciation of the independence·interdependence conflict in the 
commercial law accommodates synthesis. The thesis of this essay is that 
the independence· interdependence conflict is insoluble; it is a tension that 
21. See DoLAN, supra note 10, ~ 3.06 (citations omitted), which states: 
By making unfounded charges of fraud, account parties can seriously weaken the promptness 
feature of the standby credit. Some account parties have gone further and have attempted to 
use claims of fraud in the underlying transaction to delay or prohibit payment of the credit. 
Most courts have rejected these attempts, which, if widely successful, would destroy the standby 
credit. 
Independence of the letter of credit undertaking is also vital in commercial credits. See Boris 
Kozolchyk, The Legal Nature of the Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit , 14 AM. J. CoMP. L. 
395 (1965). However, it is in the standby context that the consequences of the principle's operation 
are most profound. 
22. See John F. Dolan, Standby Letters of Credit and Fraud (Is the Standby Only Another 
Invention ofthe Goldsmiths in Lombard Street?), 7 CARDOZO L . REV. 1 (1985). Professor Dolan has 
also described the unique characteristics of the standby letter of credit, a two-party undertaking 
which he argues must not be subject to the operation of suretyship principles: 
The letter of credit ... comes to us from the law merchant and is a creature of merchants 
and bankers and not of lawyers. Consequently, the letter of credit does not fit well into the law 
of contract, where common law judges and lawyers are wont to put it. Being a specialty, the 
letter of credit needs the unique protection that the law merchant customarily has afforded to 
specialties. That protection consists above all of two features: (1) the principle that the spe-
cialty enjoys independence from related transactions that nonspecialties do not enjoy, and (2) 
the rule that specialties can command punctilious observance of their conditions. The first of 
these features of the law merchant is the independence principle the second is the strict compli-
ance rule. 
/d. at 1. 
23. See American Bell Int' l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420, 426 (S.D. N.Y. 
1979) ("Manufacturers faces [sic] a loss of credibility in the international banking community that 
could result from its failure to make good on a letter of credit."). 
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must be harnessed. This perspective provides the means to appraise both 
the crucial scope issues implicated in the suretyship law and the Restate-
ment's efforts to reconcile the in:econcilable. 
This essay argues that the Restatement of Suretyship starts at the 
wrong place. Suretyship does not arise solely in transactions involving 
three interrelated parties when the parties have decided to form the sure-
tyship relation. Suretyship also arises when a court examines a transac-
tion and determines that the relation among the parties is 
interdependent, such that the surety's liability is determined by reference 
to the contract between the obligee and the principal obligor. To the 
extent a court reviewing the issuer's payment on a standby credit consid-
ers the account party's allegation of fraud in the underlying transaction 
between the beneficiary and the account party, the court imports surety-
ship principles to the letter of credit law and sacrifices independence in 
favor of interdependence. 
The attraction to interdependence is quite strong, perhaps irresisti-
ble. The Restatement's failure, even active refusal, to appreciate that cir-
cumstance undermines the scope of the Restatement and precludes the 
real contribution to the law that should be intended by the American 
Law Institute, the sponsoring organization. It is an opportunity 
squandered. 
Part II of this essay surveys the phases of suretyship, through the 
variable commercial guaranty agreements to the various other commer-
cial devices that implicate suretyship principles. This survey describes 
the means that commercial transactors use to elaborate upon the three-
party relationship and reveals the fundamental affinity among the extant 
devices. When that affinity is patent, the independence-interdependence 
tension emerges in stark relief. Part III then contrasts interdependence 
in commercial guaranties with conceptions of independence in letters of 
credit. Part III concludes that the distinction is ultimately ephemeral 
and, given the nature of the fraud law, cannot be ratcheted otherwise: 
the independence-interdependence wheel must move in both directions; 
this motion is fundamental and irresistible. Part IV offers a reconcilia-
tion of the competing commercial values to support a definition of sure-
tyship that is considerate of commercial and jurisprudential realities. 
II. THE PHASES OF SURETYSHIP 
As commercial transactors devise new credit enhancement devices, 
new ways to assure that if B does not perform, A will, thereby making C 
whole, the suretyship law metamorphoses. Each contractual undertak-
ing that involves coincident three-party rights and duties may give rise to 
suretyship. Therefore, an understanding of the scope of suretyship must 
proceed from a broad perspective that endeavors to be inclusive rather 
than exclusive. But the job of delimiting scope, by definition, necessarily 
contemplates exclusion. Therefore, the law must discover the bases of 
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exclusion to delimit and define, but most effectively does so only after 
pursuing an analysis that proceeds from an inclusive predisposition. The 
scope of suretyship is a product of the conflict between that inclusiveness 
and exclusiveness. 
Each of the contexts described in this part implicates suretyship 
principles. The consequences of this implication, however, may, and 
generally are, adjusted by the terms of the contract among the affected 
parties. The possible contours of those terms are, for the most part, be-
yond the scope of this survey. The focus here is on the interdependence 
of the three-party rights. 
A. Commercial Guaranty Agreements 
A rudimentary catalog of the extant variety of commercial guaranty 
agreements may serve as a glossary and help establish a frame of refer-
ence. The forms of commercial guaranty agreements are limited only by 
the imagination of counsel and the business challenges confronting their 
clients. Commercial guaranty agreements are categorized in terms of the 
guarantor's undertaking. Insofar as the contours of that undertaking are 
fixed by contract, generalization is of limited utility. Furthermore, a sin-
gle agreement may have the characteristics of more than one "type" of 
guaranty. In addition, the labels below are generic and may be subject to 
different usages by different transactors and courts. 
1. The Absolute or Conditional Undertaking 
In an absolute guaranty, the guarantor agrees to answer for the duty 
of the debtor, notwithstanding the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any 
event, whether or not within the contemplation of the parties at the time 
the guarantor executes the guaranty. The creditor who takes an absolute 
and unconditional guaranty may require the guarantor's performance, 
without regard to the existence of the primary obligor's defense to per-
formance of the primary obligor's contract with the creditor. 24 
The absolute guaranty is distinct from the conditional undertaking, 
in which the guarantor agrees to answer for the duty of the debtor only 
upon the occurrence or satisfaction of some prescribed condition. That 
condition may be the debtor's failure to make a scheduled payment on a 
loan, an action by the debtor that impairs the interests of the creditor, or 
nothing more than the sun's rising or not rising one day. The conditional 
guaranty is just like any other contract that fixes a condition precedent to 
a party's duty to perform. 25 Typically, guaranties in sophisticated com-
mercial transactions are absolute and unconditional: the creditor wants 
the right to enforce the guaranty free of the guarantor's defense that a 
condition precedent to enforcement of the guaranty has not been satis-
24. See Peter A. Alces, The Efficacy of Guaranty Contracts in Sophisticated Commercial Trans-
actions, 61 N.C. L. REV. 655, 656 (1983). 
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 227(1) & 227(2) (1979). 
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fied. Existing case law confirms the presumption that guaranties are ab-
solute rather than conditional. 26 
2. General or Special Guaranty 
While a guaranty must, as a matter of logic, be either conditional or 
unconditional (absolute), the general or special dichotomy is more a mat-
ter of degree. The general guaranty is at one extreme and the narrowly 
circumscribed special guaranty is at the other. 
If a guarantor signs a guaranty that substantially states, "I under-
take to answer for all debts, obligations, and liabilities of Debtor," that is 
as close to a general guaranty as the law will recognize. The guarantor 
assures all who choose to do business with the debtor that if the debtor 
does not discharge its obligations, the guarantor will do so on the 
debtor's behalf. 
If, on the other hand, a guarantor signs a guaranty that provides the 
guarantor's assumption of the obligation to answer for specific duties of 
the debtor, circumscribed further by reference to the particular creditor 
to whom the obligation is owed, then the guaranty is special rather than 
general. While some special guaranties are more special than others, 
most guaranties do not expose the guarantor to liability for absolutely 
every debt incurred by the debtor. The scope of the debtor's liabilities for 
which the guarantor must answer is generally determined by the terms of 
the agreement between the creditor and the debtor.27 An exemplary case 
captures the importance of the dichotomy. 
In New Holland, Inc. v. Trunk,28 a manufacturer sold goods on 
credit to a dealership, and the dealership's payment was guaranteed by 
an individual principal of the dealership. When the manufacturer sold its 
business, it assigned the financing agreement and the guaranty to New 
Holland. The court considered the Florida law governing the assignment 
of guaranties and concluded that while general guaranties may be as-
signed, special guaranties would generally not be assignable. 29 
26. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. McRae, 183 P.2d 385, 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1947) ("A guaranty is unconditional unless its terms import some condition precedent to the liability 
of the guarantor."); Rucker v. Republic Supply Co., 415 P.2d 951, 953 (Okla. 1966) (" A guaranty is 
deemed unconditional unless its terms import a condition precedent to liability."); lves v. Williams, 
129 S.E. 675, 676 (Va. Ct. App. 1925) ("[A] guaranty is deemed to be absolute unless its terms 
import some condition precedent to the liability of the guarantor."). 
27. A typical form might provide: "Guarantor unconditionally guarantees the full and prompt 
payment of any and all debts, obligations and liabilities currently existing and hereafter arising of 
[Debtor] to [Creditor] pursuant to the Agreement or any other agreement, document, or instrument 
to which [Debtor] and [Creditor] are party ('Liabilities')." ALCES ET AL., supra note 9, § 16.18. 
28. New Holland, Inc. v. Trunk, 579 So. 2d 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
29. The court did, however, note a split of authority on the issue, stating four basic 
approaches: 
Some courts hold that the assignment of a special guaranty is effective to collect obligations 
existing at the time of the assignment . . . others hold that whether a special guaranty can be 
enforced to collect debts accruing after the assignment is a question of fact to be resolved by 
reference to the intent of the parties ... while still others hold that whether a special guaranty is 
assignable depends on whether the undertaking of the guarantor has been materially altered by 
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The case involved the assignment of the right to receive payments 
on account of advances made by the assignor to the primary obligor prior 
to the assignment. The court reasoned that it would be inconsistent with 
the terms of the special guaranty to permit the assignee to enforce the 
guaranty against the guarantor on account of advances made by the as-
signee to the primary obligor after the assignment. 30 The court viewed 
the transactions between the primary obligor and the assignor prior to 
assignment as a completed transaction. Therefore, a debt had arisen 
which was collectible by the assignee. Any obligations incurred after the 
assignment would not be collectible by the assignee due to the material 
alteration in the circumstances surrounding the specific guaranty agree-
ment entered into by the guarantor prior to assignment. 
3. Continuing Guaranty 
The practice in many commercial transactions is to establish an 
ongoing relationship between the creditor and the debtor as opposed to a 
single, isolated transaction. That practice is accommodated by the uni-
form personal property security law's provision for collateral interests in 
presently existing as well as after-acquired property, so-called floating 
liens, 31 and for extension of those collateral interests to secure "future 
advances."32 When the creditor and the debtor contemplate such a con-
tinuing creditor-debtor relationship, the creditor will require that the 
guarantor provide a continuing guaranty.33 
4. Guaranty of Payment or Collection 
The guarantor's obligation may also be determined by reference to 
that time when the guarantor's performance is required. Some guaran-
the assignment . . .. Others steadfastly adhere to the common law rule precluding assignment of 
special guaranties. 
/d. at 217 n.l (citations omitted). 
30. /d. at 218. 
31. U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1990) provides, in pertinent part, that "(e]xcept as provided in subsec-
tion (2), a security agreement may provide that any or all obligations covered by the security agree-
ment are to be secured by after-acquired collateral." Comment 2 to the provision explains that 
"Article (Nine) accepts the principle of a 'continuing general lien.' ... This Article validates a 
security interest in the debtor's existing and future assets, even though . . . the debtor has liberty to 
use or dispose of collateral without being required to account for proceeds or substitute new 
collateral." 
32. U.C.C. § 9-204(3) (1990) provides, in pertinent part, that "{o]bligations covered by a secur-
ity agreement may include future advances or other value whether or not the advances or value are 
given pursuant to commitment." 
33. For cases illustrating the use of continuing guarantees, see Standard Oil v. Houser, 225 
P.2d 539 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950); Valley Nat'l Bank v. Foreign Car Rental, Inc., 404 P.2d 272 (Colo. 
1965); Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Warner, 535 P.2d 1132 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Ransom Distrib. 
Co. v. Lazy B. Ltd., 532 P.2d 364 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); Bonura v. Christiana Bros. Poultry Co., 
336 So. 2d 881 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Harley, 13 So. 2d 84 (La. Ct. App. 
1943); Riverside Nat') Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P .2d 438 (Okla. 1980); Rucker v. Republic Supply 
Co., 415 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1966); Houston Furniture Distrib., Inc. v. Bank, 562 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1978); Reece v. First State Bank, 555 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Blount v. Westing-
house Credit Corp., 432 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). 
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ties allow the creditor to call on the guarantor to perform immediately 
after the debtor has failed to pay. Other guaranties require the guaran-
tor's performance only after the creditor's efforts to collect the debt from 
the debtor have proceeded through judgment to a nulla bona return of 
the writ of execution. The difference between a guaranty of payment 
(guarantor pays as soon as debtor defaults) and a guaranty of collection 
(guarantor pays only after recourse to legal proceedings proves unavail-
ing) is explained clearly in Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 34 
5. Limited or Unlimited Guaranty 
The exigencies of a particular transaction, as well as the dynamics 
among the creditor, debtor, and guarantor, may dictate a form of guar-
anty that in some way limits the dollar amount of the liability assumed 
by the guarantor. For example, the creditor may loan the debtor $10,000 
and, before doing so, require that the guarantor promise to answer for 
$5,000 of the debt if the debtor defaults. The creditor may want that 
$5,000 to be any portion of the debt remaining unpaid, up to $5,000. 
Thus, if the debtor pays $5,000 of the debt, the creditor might expect that 
the guarantor pay all of the remaining $5,000. The guarantor, however, 
might argue that the $5,000 he had guaranteed was the $5,000 that the 
debtor had already paid, resulting in no additional liability on the guar-
anty. Careful drafting of the guaranty, however, should resolve any 
ambiguity. 35 
The unlimited guaranty is more common and obligates the guaran-
tor to answer for all of the debt owed the creditor by the debtor. While 
34. See U.C.C. § 3-416 (1989): 
(1) "Payment guaranteed" or equivalent words added to a signature mean that the signer en-
gages that if the instrument is not paid when due he will pay it according to its tenor without 
resort by the holder to any other party. 
(2) "Collection guaranteed" or equivalent words added to a signature mean that the signer 
engages that if the instrument is not paid when due he will pay it according to its tenor, but only 
after the holder has reduced his claim against the maker or acceptor to judgment and execution 
has been returned unsatisfied, or after the maker or acceptor has become insolvent or it is 
otherwise apparent that it is useless to proceed against him. 
The 1990 revision of Article 3 provides only a definition of a collection guaranty; see U.C.C. § 3-419 
(1990): 
(d) If the signature of a party to an instrument is accompanied by words indicating unambigu-
ously that the party is guaranteeing collection rather than payment of the obligation of another 
party to the instrument, the signer is obliged to pay the amount due on the instrument to a 
person entitled to enforce the instrument only if (i) execution of judgment against the other 
party has been returned unsatisfied, (ii) the other party is insolvent or in an insolvency proceed-
ing, (iii) the other party cannot be served with process, or (iv) it is otherwise apparent that 
payment cannot be obtained from the other party. 
All citations in this essay to U.C.C. Article 3 are to the revised 1990 version unless citation to the 
1989 version is expressly indicated. 
35. See, e.g. , 9 AM. JuR. 2D Legal Forms § 132:41 "Guaranty of payment of rent under lease" 
(1985): 
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 
The maximum amount recoverable by obligee from [debtor] pursuant to this guaranty is-
- Dollars ($ - ), which amount is equal to the total rent due during the initial -year term of 
the lease. If the aggregate of payments made by [debtor] hereunder reaches the above-men-
tioned amount, this guaranty shall terminate immediately. 
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payments made to the creditor by the debtor will reduce the outstanding 
liabilities and, consequently, the guarantor's exposure, the guarantor will 
not be able to establish that its liability was in some way extinguished 
altogether by a partial payment. 
This characterization and construction issue was involved in a Sixth 
Circuit case, Memphis Sheraton Corp. v. Kirkley. 36 There, the guarantors 
contracted to answer for the .first $200,000 of a $1.1 million indebtedness. 
The property securing the debtor's repayment of the primary obligation 
was sold at foreclosure for $540,000, more than the amount of the guar-
anty but substantially less than the total debt. 
After noting that guaranty agreements are to be construed against 
the guarantor and in a manner indulgent of the rights of the creditor 
under Tennessee law,37 the court found for the creditor. The holding 
seemed to rely on the fact that the guaranty agreement stated that the 
guarantors would guarantee "the first $200,000 independently of [credi-
tor's] pursuing any action under the deed of trust or the security 
agreement. " 38 
The foregoing description of the phases of commercial guaranty 
agreements reveals the suretyship relation captured by the devices: the 
obligation of the guarantor (secondary obligor) is determined by refer-
ence to the rights of the principal obligor. It is that "determined by ref-
erence" calculus that is the foundation of suretyship; it is the suretyship 
principle. The following section reveals the other commercial settings in 
which the rights of three parties are interrelated and in which the surety-
ship principle operates, subject to the contours of the contracts' adjust-
ments of suretyship rights. 
36. Memphis Sheraton Corp. v. Kirkley, 640 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1981). 
37. The Kirkley court's conclusion reflected the general bias of the Tennessee judiciary against 
guarantors and the guaranty undertaking: "Tennessee does not favor guarantors and will construe a 
guaranty against the guarantor as strongly as the language will admit." /d. at 17 (citing several 
Tennessee decisions to support its conclusion: Farmers-Peoples Bank v. Clemmer, 519 S.W.2d 801, 
805 (Tenn. 1975) (commercial bank transaction); Nashville Elec. Supply Co. v. Kay Indus., Inc., 533 
S.W.2d 306, 310 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975) (guaranty to supply company to answer for debts of purchas-
ing company); First Nat'l Bank v. Foster, 451 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969) (guaranty to 
bank to answer for corporate debtor's obligations); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Taylor, 398 S.W.2d 81, 87 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1965) (guaranty of full performance in commercial setting); Hassell-Hughes Lum-
ber Co. v. Jackson, 232 S.W.2d 325, 329 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949) (guaranty of product acceptance)). 
The illogical, not to mention cynical, character of its observation notwithstanding, the Kirkley 
court's candor reveals the provocative nature of the commercial guaranty dynamic. Some courts 
have expressed predispositions diametrically opposed to that of the Kirkley court. See, e.g., Texas 
Commerce Bank v. Capital Bancshares, 907 F.2d 1571, 1574 (5th Cir. 1990) ("A guarantor is a 
'favorite of the law' and a guaranty is therefore construed strictly in favor of the guarantor." (quot-
ing McKnight v. Virginia Mirror Co., 463 S.W.2d 428,430 (Tex. 1971))); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. 
v. University Anclote, Inc., 764 F.2d 804, 806 (lith Cir. 1985) ("If a guaranty is free from ambigu-
ity, it is strictly construed in favor of the guarantor."); Heritage Bank v. Bruti, 141 Ill. App. 3d 107, 
108, 489 N.E.2d 1182, 1183, 95 Ill. Dec. 454, 455 (3d Dist. 1986) ("Generally speaking, the guaran-
tor is a favorite of the law."). Still, the fact remains that the law of guaranties is persistently preoc-
cupied with jurisprudential and even political (in the broader economic sense) ramifications. 
38. Kirkley, 640 F .2d at 18. 
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B. Other Forms of Commercial Law Suretyship 
There are commercial contexts beyond the guaranty agreement set-
ting in which suretyship principles are implicated and in which the 
courts often proceed from a suretyship perspective. 
1. Suretyship in the Uniform Commercial Code 
Since the time that the Uniform Commercial Code was promul-
gated, 39 several provisions of Article 3 have addressed aspects of the rela-
tionship among the creditor, debtor, and guarantor. For example, a 
negotiable instrument, either note or draft, may contemplate a third 
party whose obligation is determined by reference to the debtor-creditor 
relationship of two other parties. Two examples are illustrative. 
First, a promissory note issued by the issuer40 and enforceable by 
the "holder"41 may also be "signed"42 by a co-maker, an indorser, or a 
guarantor. Second, a "check, "43 a form of "draft, "44 may be drawn by a 
"drawer"45 and signed by a co-drawer, an indorser, an "acceptor,"46 or a 
guarantor. While the tripartite relationship that exists in both the note 
39. The Code was originally promulgated in 1951 and first enacted in Pennsylvania in 1953, 
effective July 1, 1954. AMERICAN LAW INST. & NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM 
STATE LAWS, General Comment of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
and the American Law Institute, in SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES 19 (West 1992). 
40. See U.C.C. § 3-105(c) (1990), which defines issuer as including the maker of a note, and 
§ 3-412, which describes the contractual undertaking of the issuer of a note: 
The issuer of a note or cashier's check or other draft drawn on the drawer is obliged to pay the 
instrument (i) according to its terms at the time it was issued or, if not issued, at the time it first 
came into possession of a holder, or (ii) if the issuer signed an incomplete instrument, according 
to its terms when completed, to the extent stated in Sections 3-115 and 3-407. The obligation is 
owed to a person entitled to enforce the instrument or to an indorser who paid the instrument 
under Section 3-415. 
41. See U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (1990), which states that" '[h]older,' with respect to a negotiable 
instrument, means the person in possession if the instrument is payable to bearer or, in the case of an 
instrument payable to an identified person, if the identified person is in possession." 
42. See U.C.C. § 1-201(39) (1990), which defines signed as including "any symbol executed or 
adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing." 
43. See U.C.C. § 3-104(t) (1990), which defines check as "(i) a draft, other than a documentary 
draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank or (ii) a cashier's check or teller's check. An instru-
ment may be a check even though it is described on its face by another term, such as 'money 
order.'" 
44. See U.C.C. § 3-104{e) (1990), which defines draft by stating that "[a]n instrument is a 
'note' if it is a promise and is a 'draft' if it is an order. If an instrument falls within the definition of 
both 'note' and 'draft,' a person entitled to enforce the instrument may treat it as either." 
45. See U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(3) (1990), which defines drawer as "a person who signs or is identi-
fied in a draft as a person ordering payment." The drawer's contract is provided by § 3-414. 
46. Acceptance and its consequences are determined by U.C.C. § 3-409 (1990), which provides 
in part: 
(a) "Acceptance" means the drawee's signed agreement to pay a draft as presented. It must be 
written on the draft and may consist of the drawee's signature alone. Acceptance may be made 
at any time and becomes effective when notification pursuant to instructions is given or the 
accepted draft is delivered for the purpose of giving rights on the acceptance to any person. 
(b) A draft may be accepted although it has not been signed by the drawer, is otherwise incom-
plete, is overdue, or has been dishonored. 
(c) If a draft is payable at a fixed period after sight and the acceptor fails to date the acceptance, 
the holder may complete the acceptance by supplying a date in good faith. 
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and draft setting may or may not give rise to the interdependence of 
rights and liabilities governed by suretyship law, the policies implicated 
when a court is sorting out the parties' responsibilities inter se may well 
prove similar to those vindicated by suretyship law generally. 
2. Suretyship-like A"angements in Financing Transactions47 
A number of common commercial devices and transactions also in-
volve the interdependent three-party undertakings that invoke the opera-
tion of suretyship principles. Any formulation of the scope of suretyship 
must therefore consider the parameters of these devices and transactions. 
a. Subordination, Intercreditor, and Loan Participation 
Agreements 
It is not uncommon in commercial transactions for one creditor to 
expressly subordinate its position to that of another creditor. This is 
usually accomplished at the insistence of the creditor whose claim is to 
be granted priority vis-a-vis the subordinating creditor. The Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978 explicitly sanctions these contractual arrange-
ments.48 
A subordination agreement generally involves an undertaking on 
the part of the subordinated creditor (junior creditor, JC) to not accept 
any payments on the obligation owed to it by the debtor before the credi-
tor in whose favor the agreement operates (senior creditor, SC) has re-
ceived a full satisfaction of its claim against the debtor. In the event the 
JC does receive a payment from the debtor, it is obligated to remit it to 
the SC. If the SC is not fully repaid as a result of receiving payments 
referable to the junior debt, the JC will be subrogated to the rights of the 
SC as against the debtor.49 
The subordination setting involves a three-party arrangement in 
which one party, the JC, gives something to another party, the SC, in 
order to assure the debtor's payment to that third party SC. A subordi-
nation agreement gives rise to a three-party relationship that is similar in 
important ways to other transactions contemplated by suretyship princi-
47. The description of commercial suretyship and suretyship-like contexts offered in this 
section is developed in substantial part from a survey by Howard Ruda, a member of the New York 
bar and one of the Advisers to the Restatement of Suretyship project. See Letter from Howard 
Ruda, of counsel, Han & Hessen, to Neil B. Cohen, Professor, Brooklyn Law School (Nov. 26, 1990) 
(on file with author). 
48. See BANKRUPTCY CODE§ 510, 11 U.S.C. § 510 (1978), which states, in pertinent part: "A 
subordination agreement is enforceable in a case under this title to the same extent that such agree-
ment is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law." 
49. See GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY§ 37.1 (1965) (dis-
cussing types of subordination agreements and situations in which they have been used); see also 
Letter from Howard Ruda to Neil B. Cohen, supra note 47, at 4 ("If there are two subordinating 
creditors, will they have rights of contribution against each other? Does it matter whether they are 
both parties to the same underlying subordination agreement or are separately subordinating unre-
lated debts?"). 
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pies. 50 The rights of the JC vis-a-vis the SC are determined by reference 
to the debtor's performance of its agreement with the SC. 
Creditors of a common debtor may also enter into an intercreditor 
agreement to determine their rights to collateral securing the debtor's 
payment of the obligations owed to each creditor. Creditor 2, not neces-
sarily later in time than creditor 1, may agree with creditor 1 to not 
proceed against the common collateral before the debt owed to creditor 1 
has been fully satisfied. s 1 · · 
Alternatively, creditor 1 might make a loan to the debtor, and then 
either simultaneously or subsequently decide to "sell" or "participate" a 
portion of that loan to creditor 2. The terms of such an intercreditor or 
loan participation agreement may implicate suretyship principles if credi-
tor 2 takes a junior position vis-a-vis creditor 1. If creditor 2 agrees to be 
paid only after the portion of the loan owned by creditor 1 is satisfied, 
creditor 2 is thereby subordinated to creditor 1, and its rights will be 
determined by reference to the debtor's performance. 
b. "Keep Well" Agreements 
A keep well agreement looks much like a guaranty. However, 
rather than guarantying the debtor's repayment to the creditor, the sec-
ondary obligor contracts to assure the continued fiscal well-being of the 
debtor. This is close to a warranty, however, and the Restatement of 
Security expressly excludes warranties from the scope of suretyship 
law. 52 Certainly not every warranty that arises in the commercial law 
50. See ALCES ET AL., supra note 9, § 28:68 for a fonn subordination agreement which reads 
in part: 
In consideration of subordinating creditor entering into this subordination agreement, fa-
vored creditor agrees to lend -- dolJars to debtor in accordance with that certain agree-
ment, of even date herewith, between favored creditor and debtor. 
In consideration of favored creditor making aforesaid loan to debtor, subordinating credi-
tor agrees to subordinate payment of all existing indebtedness of debtor to subordinating credi-
tor, together with alJ security interests, whether or not perfected, securing same, and 
particularly to subordinate payment of all indebtedness of debtor to subordinating creditor 
under the certain [security] agreement .... 
51. See Letter from Howard Ruda to Neil B. Cohen, supra note 47, at II: 
(e) Other examples of lien subordinations are: 
(I) The issuer of a CD, which D has pledged to C, agrees not to assert any setoff or 
security interest against the CD. 
(2) A textile processor agrees with C, who has an inventory lien on D' s goods which are 
processed by the processor, that it will not assert its statutory textile processor's lien 
against the inventory. 
(3) A landlord, mortgagee or warehouseman waives its statutory or contractual rights 
against D's property in which C has a security interest. 
52. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 82 cmt. J (1941): 
The word "warranty" has the same philological origin as "guaranty" and in popular usage 
the two words are often used as synonyms. In this sense, the tenn "guaranty" is not synony-
mous with "suretyship." This usage is not employed in the Restatement of [Security]. 
Without attempting any precise definition of "warranty" as used in respect of conveyances 
of real property, the sale of goods, assignment of rights, insurance, and contracts, it signifies a 
· representation or promise as to the title, quality or quantity of a thing or of its fitness for a 
particular purpose, or is a stipulation that something exists or has happened. The term "im-
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context gives rise to all of the incidents of suretyship. 53 
c. Sale of Accounts Receivable 
The sale of accounts receivable, a transaction generally within the 
scope ofU.C.C. Article 9,54 creates a tripartite relationship in which the 
obligations of one of the parties are determined by reference to the per-
formance of another party. In a typical sale of accounts, a debtor with 
outstanding accounts receivable sells (or grants a collateral interest in) 
those accounts to the creditor; thereafter the parties liable on the ac-
counts, account debtors (ADs), make payments on the accounts directly 
to the creditor (or a "lock box" within the creditor's control). These 
ADs, therefore, for the purpose of demonstrating suretyship parallels, are 
the primary obligors; the creditor expects payment on the accounts from 
the ADs. As the ADs make payments on the accounts, those payments 
are credited to the account of the debtor, gradually retiring the principal 
indebtedness owed the creditor. 
The transaction between the debtor and the creditor may be an out-
right sale, in which the creditor assumes all of the risk that the accounts 
will not be paid, 55 thus constituting a nonrecourse sale of accounts. 
However, in the event that the transaction between the debtor and the 
creditor was a collateral transaction, pursuant to which the debtor did 
not sell the accounts to the creditor but, instead, granted the creditor 
only a collateral interest in the receivables, then the debtor would remain 
liable for any non performing accounts and would, concomitantly, be en-
titled to any surplus. 56 The same result may be accomplished by contract 
even if the debtor-creditor transaction is denominated a sale of ac-
counts. 57 This latter form is termed a recourse sale or hypothecation of 
accounts. 
Insofar as the recourse transaction measures the obligation of the 
debtor by reference to performance of the account debtors, it may be 
conceived in suretyship terms: the debtor is the guarantor of the ADs' 
plied warranty" denotes an obligation imposed by law where there is no representation or prom-
tse. 
Suretyship involves three persons, warranty, two. The obligation of the surety is accesso-
rial to the obligation of the principal. The obligation of the warrantor is independent of any 
obligation of another, but is part of or collateral to a contract of his own. 
53. See JOHN HANNA, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SECURITY 348-49 (2d ed. 1940) (distin-
guishing warranty from suretyship and citing discussion in Solomon Sturges & Co. v. Bank of Cir-
cleville, 11 Ohio St. 153, 168 (1860)). 
54. See U.C.C. § 9-102(l)(b) (1990): "Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-104 on ex-
cluded transactions, this Article applies ... (b) to any sale of accounts or chattel paper." 
55. See id. § 9-504(2). 
56. See id. , which states that "[i]f the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured 
party must account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable 
for any deficiency." 
57. /d., stating, "[l]f the underlying transaction was a sale of accounts or chattel paper, the 
debtor is entitled to any surplus or is liable for any deficiency only if the security agreement so 
provides." 
No.3] THE SURETYSHIP PRINCIPLE 463 
performance. In the event the ADs, or any of them, default, in whole or 
in part, the creditor will call on the debtor to perform in their stead. 
d. "Put Agreements" 
When one party agrees to purchase property from another, the cred· 
itor, at some future time to be determined by the creditor, the pur· 
chaser's obligation may give rise to the suretyship relationship, in that 
the property represents the obligation of a third party to the creditor. 
For example, if a creditor buys (perhaps from the payee) a promissory 
note made by the debtor, with the understanding that the payee will re· 
purchase that note in the event the creditor calls on the payee to do so, 
that "put agreement" is the type of tripartite arrangement involved in the 
suretyship law. 
The transaction, however, need not contemplate the negotiation of 
an instrument. A secured creditor not eager to take possession of collat· 
eral for foreclosure purposes may cause the debtor to agree with a third 
party that the third party will purchase the collateral from the secured 
party. Such an arrangement provides the secured party with a ready, 
willing, and able buyer for the collateral and also inures to the benefit of 
all three parties. ss The duty of the third party is determined by reference 
to the rights of the secured creditor against the debtor. 
e. Finance Leases 
Article 2A of the U. C C includes finance leases within its scope. s9 
S8. The debtor would benefit from the lower interest rate the debtor can obtain as a result of 
the additional security the surety's undertaking provides, and the surety would benefit from the 
access to used equipment for resale. 
S9. U.C.C. § 2A-102 (1990) ("This Article applies to any transaction, regardless of form, that 
creates a lease."). Section 2A-103(l)(g) definesfinance lease as 
a lease with respect to which: 
(i) the lessor does not select, manufacture, or supply the goods; 
(ii) the lessor acquires the goods or the right to possession and use of the goods in connec-
tion with the lease; and 
(iii) one of the following occurs: 
(A) the lessee receives a copy of the contract by which the lessor acquired the goods 
or the right to possession and use of the goods before signing the lease contract; 
(B) the lessee's approval of the contract by which the lessor acquired the goods or the 
right to possession and use of the goods before signing the lease contract; 
(C) the lessee, before signing the lease contract, receives an accurate and complete 
statement designating the promises and warranties, and any disclaimers of warranties, 
limitations or modifications of remedies, or liquidated damages, including those of a 
third party, such as the manufacturer of the goods, provided to the lessor by the per-
son supplying the goods in connection with or as part of the contract by which the 
lessor acquired the goods or the right to possession and use of the goods; or 
(D) if the lease is not a consumer lease, the lessor, before the lessee signs the lease 
contract, informs the lessee in writing (a) of the identity of the person supplying the 
goods to the lessor, unless the lessee has selected that person and directed the lessor to 
acquire the goods or the right to possession and use of the goods from that person, (b) 
that the lessee is entitled under this Article to the promises and warranties, including 
those of any third party, provided to the lessor by the person supplying the goods in 
connection with or as part of the contract by which the lessor acquired the goods or 
the right to possession and use of the goods, and (c) that the lessee may communicate 
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A finance lease is similar to a secured transaction, but rather than provid-
ing purchase money financing, the financier (finance lessor) buys the 
property from a supplier and leases it to the lessee. While the general 
rule of Article 2A provides that certain implied warranties are made by a 
lessor to a lessee, 60 the rule in finance leases is different. The warranties 
provided by the supplier (the seller) to the finance lessor (the buyer) 
under Article 2 of the U. C. C. 61 "pass through" to the finance lessee. 62 In 
return, the lessee has no warranty of quality rights against the finance 
lessor and undertakes, come "hell or high water,"63 to make all payments 
due under the lease to the finance lessor. That is, even if there is some 
problem with the quality of the leased goods, the lessee must continue to 
make lease payments to the finance lessor and may bring an action only 
against the supplier, subject to any limitations in the sales contract. The 
finance lessor may or may not have a right of recourse against the sup-
plier in the event the lessee does not make a payment, notwithstanding 
the hell or high water clause. 64 
with the person supplying the goods to the lessor and receive an accurate and com-
plete statement of those promises and warranties, including any disclaimer~ and limi-
tations of them or of remedies. 
60. /d. § 2A-212(1) provides the implied warranty of merchantability, stating in pertinent part, 
"[e]xcept in a finance lease, a warranty that the goods will be merchantable is implied in a lease 
contract if the lessor is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." Section 2A-213 provides an 
implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose, stating: 
Except in a finance lease, if the lessor at the time the lease contract is made has reason to know 
of any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the Jessee is relying on the 
lessor's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is in the lease contract an 
implied warranty that the goods will be fit for that purpose. 
61. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (merchantability), which states, in part, "Unless excluded or modified 
(Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their 
sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." See also § 2-315 (fitness for 
particular purpose) which states: 
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which 
the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or 
furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied 
warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose. 
62. See U.C.C. § 2A-209, which states in part: 
(I) The benefit of a supplier's promises to the lessor under the supply contract and of all 
warranties, whether express or implied, including those of any third party provided in connec-
tion with or as part of the supply contract, extends to the Jessee to the extent of the Jessee's 
leasehold interest under a finance lease related to the supply contract, but is subject to the terms 
of the warranty and of the supply contract and all defenses or claims arising therefrom. 
63. U.C.C. § 2A-407 cmt. I. 
64. Credit enhancement devices in the commercial law in effect act as insurance by providing a 
source of payment should the principal obligor fail to discharge its obligation to the creditor. But 
strictly speaking, "insurance" does not give rise to the suretyship arrangement; it gives rise to a 
contract between the insurer and the insured, the performance of which is generally subject to condi-
tions subsequent to the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an event, often including the mis-, mal-, or 
nonfeasance of a person. 
Generally, the suretyship versus insurance issue arises when a court must consider whether one 
party will have a viable cause of action against the other or a third party, and its resolution depends 
upon the court's determination of the scope of suretyship law. 
The Restatement of Security separately listed and described various forms of fidelity or perform-
ance insurance under three headings. First, "Third Party Beneficiaries in Construction Contracts": 
Where a surety for a contractor on a construction contract agrees in terms with the owner that 
the contractor will pay for labor and materials, or guarantees to the owner the promise of the 
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The Article 2A statutory hell or high water clause changes the inter-
relation of rights that would exit were the finance lessor's rights vis-a-vis 
the finance lessee subject to defenses that the finance lessee would other-
wise have arising from deficiencies in the leased goods. If the finance 
lessee could avoid liability to the finance lessor .because the supplier had 
breached the warranty of merchantability, then the finance lessor's rights 
would, in fact, be determined by reference to the rights of the supplier 
against the finance lessee. But the statutory hell or high water clause 
adjusts that interdependence by making the finance lessor's rights against 
the finance lessee independent of the finance lessee's rights against the 
supplier. The statute merely accomplishes what the parties to finance 
leases were accomplishing by private contract before the promulgation of 
Article 2A and probably continue to accomplish by the terms of the lease 
agreement. Article 2A, then, and the finance lease example demonstrate 
how a statute can formulate the parties' rights inter se in terms that do 
not deny the interdependence of related undertakings but that are atten-
tive to commercial exigencies. 
Part II of this essay has surveyed the commercial contexts in which 
the rights of three parties are interrelated and has demonstrated how the 
incidents of that interrelation may be determined by ( 1) the terms of the 
parties' agreement(s) and (2) the provisions of apposite statutory law. 
This presentation accommodates comparison of the suretyship contexts 
with the letter of credit dynamic. 
Ill. SURETYSHIP AND LETTERS OF CREDIT 
Even the most cursory description of standby credits reveals the 
similarity between some standby credits and. the credit enhancement de-
vices described above in part 11.65 In both the various .commercial law 
contractor to pay for labor and materials, those furnishing labor or materials have a right 
against the surety as third party beneficiaries of the surety's contract, unless the surety's con-
tract in terms disclaims liability to such persons. 
REsTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 165 (1941). Second, "Official Bonds": 
Where a statute requires a public officer to furnish a bond with surety, the surety's liability for 
the officer's defaults is determined, within the penal sum stated in the bond, by his own under-
taking whether more or Jess extensive than the statutory requirements, unless there is a statu-
tory provision to the effect that an official bond shall be deemed to contain the conditions 
prescribed by statute. 
/d. § 169. And third, "Judicial Bonds": "A judicial bond is a bond furnished by or on behalf of a 
party to a judicial proceeding." /d. § 186. 
Professor John Hanna's Cases and Materials on Security, HANNA, supra note 53, places generic 
suretyship in opposition to {I) guaranties, see id. at 345, {2) insurance, see id. at 347, (3) warranty, 
see id. at 348, and (4) indorsement, see id. at 349. A contemporary fidelity insurance lawyer could 
easily develop a long list of the relatively common forms that involve the suretyship undertaking. 
See Letter from James A. Black, Jr., of Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland and Adviser to 
the Restatement of Suretyship , to Peter A. Alces, Professor, The College of William & Mary (Oct. 
15, 1991) (on file with author) (describing 37 forms of surety bonds). The letter was also submitted 
to Neil B. Cohen, Professor, Brooklyn Law School, and Reporter, Restatement of Suretyship . 
65. Two articles appearing in a recent symposium issue treat the operation of some suretyship 
rules in the Jetter of credit context. See Amelia H. Boss, Suretyship and Letters of Credit: Subroga-
tion Revisited, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1087 (1993) (arguing that courts should apply subrogation 
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credit enhancement mechanisms and standby credits, the interdepen-
dence of the third-party payment obligation and the performance respon-
sibilities of the parties to the underlying transaction are manifest. But 
the parties to the commercial credit enhancement devices understand 
and intend that interdependence; in the standby credit context, issuers 
urge the independence of their undertaking and argue that the intended 
independence in fact defines the credit. So long as that independence is 
respected, issuers of credits will be able to remain above the fray between 
the account party and the beneficiary concerning the equities of the un-
derlying transaction. 66 To the extent that interdependence exists, the 
principal obligor's (letter of credit account party's) fraud allegation will 
excuse the secondary obligor's (issuer's) payment obligation. If indepen-
dence is the rule, fraud allegations, no matter how compelling, must fall 
on deaf ears. The secondary obligor, guarantor, or issuer will be impo-
tent to resist payment on account of that fraud. 
A. The Fraud Challenge to Independence 
There is an important and distinct commercial interest in the cer-
tainty of the letter of credit issuer's undertaking in commercial law.67 
The distinctiveness of that interest provides options and serves the im-
portant economic interest that a variety of options serves in business law 
generally.68 However, that important commercial function is often un-
dermined by the courts' too pedantic, even overzealous, efforts to manip-
ulate formal or transactional requirements to render equity in a 
particular case sub judice. The battle between that temptation in individ-
ual cases and broader contextual concerns has mirrored the indepen-
dence-interdependence tension; the allegation of "fraud in the 
transaction" has provided the battleground. 
When, in a letter of credit transaction, an account party (analogous 
to the primary obligor in the suretyship law) wants to resist the benefici-
ary's (analogous to obligee's) demand that the issuer (analogous to secon-
dary obligor) pay a sum of money represented by the credit, due to the 
principles to determine rights of issuer to recover from account party after issuer honors demand on 
standby credit); Gerald T. McLaughlin, Standby Letters of Credit and Guaranties: An Exercise in 
Canography, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1139 (1993) (suggesting circumstances in which courts 
should disregard the letter of credit independence principle). 
66. Professor Boss recognizes that issuers are only interested in assuming this posture if their 
interests are not compromised by independence, and she argues that so long as issuers do not com-
promise the independence of the credit before or at the time of the beneficiary's demand the commer-
cial utility of the standby credit is not undermined. See Boss, supra note 65, at 1120-27. 
67. See generally William D. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. 
ILL. L.F. 291. 
68. For a consideration of the important commercial purposes served by the provision of trans-
actional alternatives in an analogous context, see Lary Lawrence, Making Cashiers' Checks and 
Other Bank Checks Cost-Effective: A Pleafor Revision of Anicles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 64 MINN. L. REV. 275 (1980). See also Peter A. Alces, A Jurisprudential Perspective for the 
True Codification of Payments Law, 53 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 83 ( 1984) (describing benefits realized 
from delineation of alternative payment media). 
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beneficiary's failure to perform in accordance with the terms of its con-
tract with the account party, the account party may allege that the bene-
ficiary's demand is fraudulent. Although Uniform Commercial Code 
subsection 5-114( I) codifies the independence of the issuer's undertaking, 
subsection 5-114(2) nonetheless recognizes that evidence of "fraud in the 
transaction" may excuse the issuer from honoring the beneficiary's de-
mand, and, not incidentally, from enforcing an indemnity claim against 
the account party.69 
The courts 70 and commentators 71 have recognized that an overly 
facile reliance on this fraud exception impairs the independence of the 
issuer's undertaking, converts the standby letter of credit into something 
more akin to a suretyship contract, and compromises the commercial 
utility of the letter of credit device. Alternatively, others have main-
tained that the violence done to commercial principles when the letter of 
credit law facilitates fraud is even more destructive than the occasional 
dislocation caused by the imposition of a fraud theory.72 
To distinguish the case in which the fraud allegation should not be 
69. U.C.C. § 5-114 (1990) provides in part: 
(1) An issuer must honor a draft or demand for payment which complies with the terms of the 
relevant credit regardless of whether the goods or documents conform to the underlying con· 
tract for sale or other contract between the customer and the beneficiary. The issuer is not 
excused from honor of such a draft or demand by reason of an additional general term that all 
documents must be satisfactory to the issuer, but an issuer may require that specified documents 
must be satisfactory to it. 
(2) Unless otherwise agreed when documents appear on their face to comply with the terms of 
a credit but a required document does not in fact conform to the warranties made on negotia-
tion or transfer of a document of title (Section 7-507) or of a certified security (Section 8-306) or 
is forged or fraudulent or there is fraud in the transaction: 
(a) the issuer must honor the draft or demand for payment if honor is demanded by a 
negotiating bank or other holder of the draft or demand which has taken the draft or 
demand under the credit and under circumstances which would make it a holder in due 
course (Section 3-302) and in an appropriate case would make it a person to whom a 
document of title has been duly negotiated (Section 7-502) or a bona fide purchaser of a 
certificated security (Section 8-302); and 
(b) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer acting in good faith may honor the 
draft or demand for payment despite notification from the customer of fraud, forgery or 
other defect not apparent on the face of the documents but a court of appropriate jurisdic-
tion may enjoin such honor. 
70. See Sztejn v. ]. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 631, 633 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1941): 
This [principle of independence] is necessary to preserve the efficiency of the letter of credit as 
an instrument for the financing of trade. One of the chief purposes of the letter of credit is to 
furnish the seller with a ready means of obtaining prompt payment for his merchandise. It 
would be most unfortunate interference with business transactions if a bank before honoring 
drafts drawn upon it was obliged or even allowed to go behind the documents, at the request of 
the buyer and enter into controversies between the buyer and the seller regarding the quality of 
the merchandise shipped. 
71. See Henry Harfield, Enjoining Letter of Credit Transactions, 95 BANKING L.J. 596, 599 
(1978) ("There can be little doubt that an expansive reading and permissive application of Section 5-
114(2)(b) could destroy the acceptability of credits established by United States issuers."). 
72. See, e.g. , Fairfax Leary, Jr. & Michael R. lppoliti, LettersofCredit: Have We Fully Recov-
ered/rom Three Insolvency Shocks?, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 595, 601 (1987) ("[J]ust as the rules 
for the recovery of payments made have not had a totally adverse effect on the acceptability of 
negotiable instruments, the few rules permitting recovery of payments made under letters of credit 
will not destroy the usefulness of this payment·assuring device."). 
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sufficient to overcome the independence principle from the case in which 
fraud ought to give way to other commercial and normative concerns, 
the courts have distinguished among degrees of fraud. The more egre-
gious the fraud, so the analysis goes, the more harsh the result of giving 
effect to the independence principle. And, the less reason there is for 
recognizing the independence principle, the more the standby letter of 
credit looks like a three· party, suretyship undertaking. 
A number of cases have focused on recitations of the fraud standard; 
that quantum of fraudulent animus that must infect a transaction before 
the good commercial reasons for independence would not be served and 
the credit should be construed in suretyship terms. 73 The consequence of 
a conclusion that the interests of independence would not be served, in 
the context considered here, is that the account party may determine the 
issuer's right to pay the beneficiary in terms of the sufficiency (or fraudu-
lence) of the beneficiary's actions. The issuer's obligation to pay is deter-
mined by reference to the account party's rights (a three-party scenario) 
rather than by the beneficiary's simple demand (a two·party 
undertaking). 
There is a fundamental incongruity in determining the independence 
of an undertaking by reference to how compelling the party resisting op· 
eration of the independence principle can make its fraud claim. Yet, if 
the independence principle is designed to serve the interests of com-
merce, the rule should not operate beyond its commercial reason. Refer-
ence to the egregiousness of the alleged fraud is the response to that 
dilemma. Furthermore, the courts' recognition that mere breach of con-
tract and active fraud are, at some level, distant (and, at times, not so 
distant) points on the same continuum 74 requires that the alleged (benefi· 
ciary) fraud-feasor's maliciousness be a part of the calculus. 
There is reason to understand the letter of credit cases as developing 
the rule that fraud allegations that amount to no more, in the court's 
view, than breaches of contract will not compel abrogation of the inde-
pendence principle and the consequent invocation of the general surety· 
ship law. The seminal letter of credit fraud decision, Sztejn v. J. Henry 
Schroder Banking Corp. , 75 had found sufficient evidence of fraud to issue 
an injunction against the issuer's honor of its letter of credit undertak-
ing. 76 But Asbury Park & Ocean Grove Bank v. National City Bank 77 
73. See, e.g., Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 730 F.2d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 1984); Roman Ceramics 
Corp. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 517 F. Supp. 526, 535 (M.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 714 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir. 
1983); Philipp Bros. v. Oil Country Specialists, Ltd., 787 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex. 1989). 
74. For a case considering the distinction, such as it is, between breach of contract and fraud, 
see Asbury Park & Ocean Grove Bank v. City National Bank, 35 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1942), a.ff'd, 52 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1944). 
75. Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941). 
76. In Sztejn , the beneficiary presented documents required for the letter of credit which de-
scribed the goods shipped as "bristles." /d. at 633. The account party sought to enjoin payment on 
the credit, alleging that the documents were fraudulent and that the matter actually shipped con-
sisted of cow hair and other worthless materials masquerading as genuine merchandise. /d. The 
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was decided by the same court just one year later, and there the court 
found a simple breach of contract instead (the presentation of altered 
documents), rather than "active" fraud. 78 One court's active fraud may 
be the same court's mere breach of contract the next time. 79 
The Texas appellate court in GATX Leasing Corp. v. DBM Drilling 
Corp. 80 considered the account party's invocation of the "fraud in the 
transaction" exception. The standby required that the beneficiary, before 
drawing on the credit, present a statement that the principal of the ac-
count party had failed to comply with the terms of a security agreement 
between the principal and one of the beneficiaries. 81 The court con-
cluded that the account party's objection was closer to an allegation of 
breach of warranty or failure of consideration; it was not the type of 
allegation that supports application of the fraud exception of subsection 
5-114(2). 82 The court determined that the a~count party was com-
plaining of no more than the invalidity of the underlying contract. 83 The 
account party did not allege the "intentional or unscrupulous conduct 
which would deprive the [account party] of any benefit of the underlying 
contract and which would transform the letter of credit ... ~nto a means 
court refused to dismiss the complaint, noting that the independence principle would not be used to 
protect a beneficiary who was defrauding the issuer with false documents. /d. at 634. 
77. Asbury Park, 35 N.Y.S.2d at 985. 
78. In Asbury Park, the plaintiff-bank applied to the defendant-bank for letters of credit on 
behalf of a customer. /d. at 987. The letters of credit were to be paid upon the defendant's receipt of 
documents evidencing the beneficiary's shipment of surplus clothing to the customer. /d. On the 
expiration date of the credits, the beneficiary presented the documents (which contained certain 
erasures) necessary for payment. /d. at 988. Shortly before the expiration date, the plaintiff-bank 
had requested that the defendant-bank not honor the drafts but the defendant found the drafts to 
comply with the terms of the credit and paid the beneficiary. /d. at 987. The plaintiff-bank claimed 
that the customer and beneficiary were using the credits to defraud the plaintiff by holding on to the 
drafts and presenting them after the customer had already sold the goods which secured repayment. 
/d. at 988. The court refused to allow the plaintiff to recover from the defendant for the payments to 
the beneficiary, reasoning that the letter of credit must remain independent of the contract between 
the buyer and the seller and the contract between the correspondent bank and the purchaser. /d. at 
989. The account party's action for damages alleged an impropriety with the beneficiary's presenta-
tion of the documents rather than a deficiency in the subject matter of the underlying contract. /d. 
at 988. The Asbury Park court distinguished Sztejn as a case supporting the imposition of a fraud 
theory when there were in fact no goods shipped. /d. at 989. 
In Sztejn, the account party sought an injunction against honor of the beneficiary's demand 
while in Asbury Park the account party sought damages from the issuer after the fact. Sztejn, 31 
N.Y.S.2d at 632; Asbury Park, 35 N.Y.S.2d at 987. It may be that the court would have required a 
greater showing of fraud to take money away from the issuer than it would to deny a beneficiary 
payment from the issuer ab initio. 
79. Dean McLaughlin has recognized that "[c]ourts and commentators ... have occasionally 
suggested that an issuing bank can utilize [underlying transaction] defenses in addition to the benefi-
ciary's fraud to justify its refusal to honor its letter-of-credit obligation." McLaughlin, supra note 
65, at 1152, citing, in particular, Fleet Bank v. Druce, 791 F. Supp. 14 (D. Me. 1992). In Fleet 
Bank, the court found that the beneficiary's bad faith conduct could justify impairment of the 
standby's independence. 791 F. Supp. at 15-16;seeauo Gerald T. McLaughlin, LettersofCreditand 
Illegal Contracts: The Limits of the Independence Principle, 49 OHIO ST. L. REv. 1197 (1989). 
80. GATX Leasing Corp. v. DBM Drilling Corp., 657 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983). 
81. ld at 180. 
82. /d. at 182-83. 
83. /d. at 182. 
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for perpetrating fraud."84 
To the extent that the difference between breach of contract and 
active fraud is a matter of degree and to the extent that interdependence 
and independence are likewise matters of degree, it is necessary to plot 
points on a graph to fully appreciate the application of suretyship princi-
ples in the standby letter of credit context. One axis of the graph would 
measure from the mere breach of contract to the egregious fraud nature 
of the account party's allegation and showing; the foregoing formulation 
of the Sztejn, Asbury Park, and GATX cases posits that continuum. 
B. Contractual Interdependence 
Developing a sense of the other axis, the one describing the indepen-
dence/interdependence continuum, is also necessary. Several standby 
letter of credit cases have considered the terms of the letter of credit itself 
in determining the extent to which the parties have impaired indepen-
dence by incorporating the terms of the underlying contract into the let-
ter of credit transaction. That is, the provisions of the letter of credit 
contract will determine relative dependence. 85 Recall that the various 
commercial suretyship devices are variously independent or interdepen-
dent depending upon their terms and their transaction context. 
The account party, the issuer, and the beneficiary of the credit for-
mulate its terms. They establish among themselves the extent to which 
payment pursuant to the credit depends on the terms of the underlying 
contract between the account party and the beneficiary. They may draft 
the credit in a way that compromises independence. For example, if the 
letter of credit requires that the issuer must pay upon the beneficiary's 
mere presentation of a draft drawn on the issuer and referencing the let-
ter of credit, the issuer must pay upon that simple demand. Thus, it is 
not difficult to discern the independence of that standby letter of credit 
undertaking. However, if the letter of credit provides that the issuer pay 
only upon the beneficiary's presentation of documents establishing the 
account party's breach of the underlying contract with the beneficiary, 
the credit's independence is definitively impaired and it will not be diffi-
cult for a reviewing court to find the three contracts interdependent. The 
three cases below illustrate effectively the courts' approach to credits 
that, by their own terms, violate the independence principle. 
In In rePine Tree Electric Co. ,86 the Bankruptcy Court for the Dis-
84. /d. at 183. 
85. The Draft Revision of Article 5 includes a Section 5-llO(d), pursuant to which "[a}n issuer 
shall disregard non-documentary conditions and treat them as if they were not stated." The apposite 
comment explains: "Where the non-documentary conditions are not ancillary (as for example a 
condition that would require the issuer to determine in fact whether the beneficiary had performed the 
underlying contract or the applicant defaulted) their inclusion may remove the undertaking from the 
scope of Article S entirely." U.C.C. § 5-110 cmt. S (Proposed Official Draft 1992). 
86. Sawyer v. EA Oralia Constr. Co. (In rePine Tree Elec. Co.), 16 B.R. 105 (Bankr. D. Me. 
1981). 
No.3] THE SURETYSHIP PRINCIPLE 471 
trict of Maine considered the debtor-account party's prayer for injunctive 
relief. 87 The account party was to perform certain electrical contracting 
work for a construction company. The account party's performance was 
secured when Northeast Bank issued a letter of credit in favor of the 
general contractor-construction company. 88 The credit was unartfully 
drafted, considering the independence principle: it was expressly made 
subject to the underlying contract between the account party and the 
beneficiary.89 It also expressly provided the account party with the right 
to cure any default before the beneficiary would be entitled to draw on 
the letter of credit on account of such default. 90 
The court concluded that the injunction could issue if either the 
standard requisites of injunctive relief were satisfied or if the demand for 
payment was fraudulent. 91 The court then found that the account party 
had sufficiently alleged fraud to support issuance of the preliminary in-
junction. 92 The finding of fraud was a product of the credit's incorpora-
tion of the underlying contract between the account party and the 
beneficiary.93 
Similarly, in O'Grady v. First Union National Bank,94 the parties to 
the standby credit destroyed its independence by providing that, in order 
to draw, the beneficiary would have to produce a" '[c]ertificate and true 
photostatic copy of each instrument causing this establishment of credit 
to [the account party] to be called upon.' " 9 s The court concluded that 
the set of documents submitted by the beneficiary was not the set con-
templated by the parties to the credit; the beneficiary was aware of that 
87. /d. at 106. 
88. /d. 
89. /d. 
90. /d. 
91. /d. at 107. For other decisions to similar effect, see, e.g., Tranarg, C.A. v. Banca Commer-
ciale ltaliana, 396 N.Y.S.2d 761 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (holding that no injunction could issue where 
issuing bank had determined that beneficiary had complied with the terms of the letter of credit and 
issued its check in compliance therewith); Foreign Venture Ltd. Partnership v. Chemical Bank, 399 
N.Y.S.2d 114 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (where irrevocable letters of credit were apparently solvent and 
the subject of a lawsuit and damages appeared to be an adequate remedy, there was no ground for 
granting a preliminary injunction). 
The Draft Revision of Article 5 makes clear that the state law prerequisites to injunctive relief 
generally must be established to support the court's injunction in the letter of credit setting: 
(f) If the applicant [account party] claims that the beneficiary has committed fraud, a 
court of competent jurisdiction may enjoin the issuer from honoring only if the court finds the 
following: 
. . . (2) that all of the conditions to entitle one to a preliminary injunction under the law of [this 
State] have been met; 
U.C.C. § 5·110(f)(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1992). 
92. In rePine Tree, 16 B.R. at 108. 
93. See id. at 106, where the court observed: 
The Letter of Credit expressly states it is "subject to all the terms and provisions of a subcon-
tract between" Gratia and Pine Tree "and to the specific terms and conditions set forth in the 
attached document, conditions to Letter of Credit, which are incorporated herein by reference." 
94. O'Grady v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 250 S.E.2d 587 (N.C. 1978). 
95. /d. at 599 (quoting letter of credit at issue). While the parties denominated the credit a 
"commercial" letter of credit, the court construed it to be a "guaranty" letter of credit, probably 
meaning a "standby" credit. /d. 
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fact: "the documents, considered as a whole, are nonetheless fraudulent 
insofar as the letter of credit was not intended to secure that particular 
note, and the beneficiary had knowledge of this fact. "96 The court found 
sufficient evidence of fraud in that "unauthorized" presentation of docu-
ments to support imposition of the fraud exception. 
Consider also the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit in Bank of Newport v. First National Bank & Trust 
Co. 97 The case involved the assignment of a nonassignable credit98 and a 
demand for payment thereunder. This credit too contained language 
providing that "[t]he drafts drawn under this Credit should state the rea-
son for the draft. "99 The beneficiary submitted its statement in support 
of the draw against the credit and alleged that the presentation was " 'in 
accordance with the letter of credit purpose.' " 100 Because the credit re-
quired the beneficiary to state the reason for the draw, the court deter-
mined that the beneficiary's statement that the draw was in accordance 
with the purpose of the credit provided the basis to invoke the fraud ex-
ception because it was in fact inconsistent with that purpose and the ben-
eficiary knew of that inconsistency. 101 Thus the draft presented by the 
beneficiary was itself found to be fraudulent. 
Those three cases demonstrate the consequences of drafting a credit 
without considering the independence principle and its fragility. They 
also illustrate how courts may construe the credit's incorporation of the 
terms of the underlying contract in a way that directly ties the documen-
tary insufficiency into the "fraud in the transaction" exception. The doc-
uments themselves are thereby viewed as sufficiently fraudulent to reveal 
"fraud in the letter of credit transaction" rather than merely fraud in the 
underlying transaction. Once the letter of credit is made subject to the 
parties' performance of the underlying contract, or to a statement of their 
performance, then an inaccuracy in the statement of that performance 
makes the demand itself fraudulent. There is, then, not just fraud in the 
underlying transaction but fraud in the letter of credit transaction as 
well. And even the most stalwart defenders of the independence princi-
ple can rationalize the decision as one involving a credit that by its own 
terms was not independent of the underlying transaction. 102 
C. Revision of Article 5 
Article 5 of the U. C. C. is currently the subject of a comprehensive 
revision effort. 103 Most pertinent for the instant inquiry, the latest pre-
96. /d. at 601. 
97. Bank of Newport v. First Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., 687 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1982). 
98. See generally DOLAN, supra note 10, ~ 3.03[4] (discussing the transferability of credits). 
99. Bank of Newport, 687 F.2d at 1259 n.2. 
100. /d. at 1264 (quoting endorsement of draft drawn pursuant to parties' letter of credit). 
101. /d. 
102. See DoLAN, supra note 10, ~ 7.04[4)[d]. 
103. See supra notes 5-6. 
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liminary draft revision offers a definition of fraud; in fact, it offers alter-
nat~ve definitions: 
"Fraud" means a presentment by one who has no colorable basis to 
be entitled to have the presentment honored. 
[or] 
"Fraud" means: 
(i) the presentment of a document that is forged or materially al-
tered; or 
(ii) presentment by one who has no colorable basis to be entitled to 
have the presentment honored. 
[or] 
"Fraud" means the presentment of a forged or materially fraudulent 
document by one who knows of the forgery or fraud. 
[or] 
"Fraud" means the presentment of a document that is forged or 
materially fraudulent. 
[or] 
Omit this subsection. 104 
The comment to the definitional alternatives explains that statutory pro-
vision of the definition is intended "to clarify and restrict the circum-
stances in which fraud can be raised as a defense to dishonor of a letter of 
credit."105 Certainly something would be gained by uniformity; but it is 
not clear that the independence principle would be vindicated. 
The revisers of Article 5 would include language in the official com-
ment to the fraud definition to the effect that "[fjraud in the underlying 
transaction does not constitute fraud as that term is used in subsection 
(a)(7)." 106 But a distinction between fraud in the credit transaction and 
fraud in the underlying transaction is specious. In fact, the very case that 
the drafters of the revision describe as providing the basis for their defini-
tion of fraud involved "fraud in the transaction." The drafters' descrip-
tion of the case reveals that coincidence: "The section 5-l03(a)(7) 
definition, as applied in section 5-110, affirms the result in Sztejn v. J. 
Henry Shroder Banking Corp., ... which enjoined payment under a letter 
of credit when the beneficiary shipped worthless rubbish instead of the 
contracted-for goods but presented documents claiming otherwise." 107 
104. The fraud definition would be pertinent with regard to the operation of U.C.C. § 5-110(e) 
(Proposed Official Draft 1992): 
If a presentment is made that appears on its face strictly to comply with the terms of the 
letter of credit, but the beneficiary has committed fraud: 
(1) the issuer shall honor a draft or demand if demanded by: 
(i) a person that under a negotiation credit has taken a draft or other demand for 
value in good faith and without notice of a defense; or 
(ii) a nominated person that has given value in good faith without notice of a 
defense; 
(2) if the conditions in paragraph (e)(l) are not met, the issuer may honor or 
dishonor. 
105. U.C.C. § 5-103 cmt. 8 (Proposed Official Draft 1992). 
106. /d. 
107. /d. 
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The documents in Sztejn were false because they did not properly de-
scribe the fraudulently substituted goods. 
The decision makes clear, then, that fraud in the credit transaction 
is the result of fraud in the underlying transaction. 108 If the only way to 
discern fraud in the documents is to examine the underlying transaction, 
all that remains is a quibble: is the fraud in the documents because they 
misdescribe the underlying (fraudulent) transaction, or does the fraud in 
the underlying transaction trump the documentary deficiency? The 
fraud is not in one place or the other; once there is fraud in the underly-
ing transaction there is necessarily fraud in the credit documentation. 
Any other conclusion would be disingenuous. 
So long as the account party's assertion of the beneficiary's fraud 109 
burdens the credit, and compromises the credit's independence, the three 
parties' relationship becomes interdependent. Interdependence, in tum, 
defines suretyship. The standby credit and commercial suretyship uni-
verses collide; there is no principled way to keep them apart. The fact of 
that collision, then, means that there is likewise no principled way to 
keep letters of credit out of the scope of the suretyship restatement. To 
deny that reality is to establish the very foundation of the suretyship re-
statement, the scope provision, on quicksand. 
D. "Plotting" Fraud 
Some commentators, far from extolling without qualification the 
virtues of the independence principle's operation in the standby context, 
have instead fashioned both good commercial reason and devices to ac-
complish the interdependence of the standby and the equities of the un-
derlying transaction. For example, Messrs. Kimball and Sanders have 
suggested that account parties avoid the harshness of the independence 
principle by avoiding the so-called suicide credit: a credit "payable upon 
a simple demand in the form of a draft."110 Account parties may realize 
many of the benefits of interdependence by including detailed documen-
tary demands in the standby, thereby "laying the foundation for a law-
suit."111 The fact that some commentators recognize the commercial 
value of interdependence from the perspective of the account party sup-
108. To similar effect, see PETER A. ALCES, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS 1J 
3.18[2][c][iii]. 
109. Note that U.C.C. § 5-110(e) (Proposed Official Draft 1992) is premised on the beneficiary's 
commission of fraud. 
110. George Kimball & Barry A. Sanders, Preventing Wrongful Payment of Guaranty Letters of 
Credit-Lessons/rom Iran, 39 Bus. LAW. 417, 436 (1984). 
111. Jd. 
Alternatively, the credit could require independent confirmation of the account party's default 
through submission of an auditor's report, independent test report, court judgment, or arbitra-
tor's ruling as a condition of payment. Such clauses are often attainable and afford excellent 
protection against arbitrary and wrongful demands for payment. The beneficiary's willingness 
to accept such terms may be conditioned upon the account party's commitment to extend the 
term of the credit until any proceedings are complete. 
/d. 
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ports the observation that the independence-interdependence tension 
may be a fact of commercial life; a fact not subject to abrogation in the 
interest of certainty insofar as that certainty may come at the expense of 
important commercial values. 
Consider, in that regard, the suggestion of Kimball and Sanders: 
Recital of the factual basis for the demand (for example, failure to 
deliver) is important. If payment should later be demanded on the 
basis of demonstrably false representations, the account party may 
establish fraud from invoices, shipping records, and similar record& 
of performance. While the issuing bank will not investigate the 
truth of such a certificate, falsehoods permit the account party to 
establish not only fraud in the transaction, but fraud in ti1e 
documents. 112 
That observation, a recommendation to those who would compromise 
the independence of the letter of credit undertaking, and the sound case 
law supporting its efficacy, demonstrate something about the indepen-
dence-interdependence axis suggested above. Recall that independence-
interdependence describes one axis while the mere breach of contract-
active fraud inquiry provides the other axis. Cases that fall within the 
active 
fraud 
mere 
breach 
independence interdependence 
shaded area are those in which the court will be less likely to invoke 
suretyship principles. Those that fall beyond the shaded area are the 
cases in which the courts would more likely apply the suretyship law. 
The ostensible certainty of that graphic illustration is designed to belie 
the uncertainty, the indeterminacy, of the calculus. It provides the 
means to line up the cases after the fact, rather than an analysis to guide 
the courts' certain determination on the basis of predictable, recurring 
facts. 
The axes are not certainly calibrated measures, on which courts can 
superimpose some conception of the relative points that may be plotted 
to determine the correct result. Each point along the axes represents a 
112. /d. at 437. 
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court's conclusion, among a range of plausible conclusions, regarding the 
breach of contract-active fraud and independence-interdependence char-
acterizations. The combinations are limited only by the imaginations of 
those who draft, those who construe, and those who perform pursuant to 
the terms of a standby credit. Recognize, as well, that the suggestion of 
the graph and the argument of commentators such as Kimball and Sand-
ers are in diametric opposition to the position of other commercial schol-
ars; scholars who champion the independence principle as crucial to the 
certainty that is the raison d'etre of the commercial law, particularly the 
letter of credit law. 
From the graphic depiction of the independence-interdependence 
dynamic, it is not difficult to appreciate that courts deciding standby 
credit cases may manipulate their conclusions regarding the constituent 
characterization issues to serve their perception of the underlying equi-
ties, at least to an extent considerate of the commercial values identified 
by the commentators. Therefore, it is crucial to remain cognizant of the 
stakes: if a court finds sufficient fraud in the transaction, the credit is 
indistinguishable from a commercial guaranty within the scope of the 
Restatement of Suretyship. That brings the inquiry full circle, and sug-
gests that courts realize the results that ftow from their abrogation of 
independence in favor of interdependence. Armed with that insight, 
courts will then characterize the beneficiary's action as fraudulent (rather 
than as a mere breach of contract) and will conclude that the terms of the 
credit incorporate the underlying transaction (interdependent rather 
than independent), thereby providing the issuer suretyship status and all 
the incidents of that status, whether the issuer is comfortable with that 
status or not. 
IV. RECONCILIATION AND DEFINITION 
Suretyship gives rise to interrelated three-party relationships. The 
performance of the three parties is interdependent: the rights and duties 
of each are determined by reference to the actions of the other two. In 
sharp contrast to the three-party suretyship transaction are two-party re-
lationships in which three parties are involved but the rights and respon-
sibilities between each two of the parties are wholly independent of one 
another. Given that both types of relationships (two- and three-party) 
involve three parties whose rights are interrelated (factually if not le-
gally), it is not surprising that the courts and commentators have exper-
ienced difficulty distinguishing the nature of the three-party transaction 
from the two-party transaction in a way that is considerate of their fun-
damental difference. 
Professor John Dolan, writing about pending efforts to develop the 
law of bank guarantees, 113 recognized the two-party/three-party tension 
113. John F. Dolan, Efforts at International Standardization of Bank Guarantees, 4 BANKING & 
FIN. L. REV. 237 (1990). 
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in terms of primary (analogous to two-party) and secondary (analogous 
to three-party) guarantees: 
[T]he distinction between primary and secondary guarantees rests 
on transactional facts, not nomenclature. A bank ~ay call a guar-
antee "primary" but fasten conditions to it that render it secondary, 
or the bank may call the guaranty "secondary" but condition it on 
the presentation of documents that render it primary. Similarly, a 
bank may designate its guarantee "primary"; but if the obligation is 
payable only against a finding that the beneficiary is entitled to pre-
vail in an underlying contract dispute, the guarantee is secondary. 
Courts, furthermore, can destroy the distinction between primary 
and secondary guarantees by reading into a guarantee conditions 
that alter its character. A court that permits or forces the guaran~or 
to determine the veracity of the beneficiary's certification will render 
secondary what would otherwise be a primary guarantee. 114 
The difficulties are exacerbated by the existence of relatively few pure 
three-party relationships and similarly few pure two-party relationships. 
The two-party or three-party label is no more than that: a label, "no-
menclature," a conclusion, not an analysis. 
It is the distinguishing characteristic of suretyship that the rights 
and duties of three parties are interdependent. From part Il's survey of 
extant credit enhancement devices, an operative definition emerges: 
Suretyship is the relationship that exists among three parties. One 
party, the primary obligor, owes primary performance of a duty to 
another party, the creditor. A third party, the surety, by contract 
assumes a secondary obligation to perform that is determined by 
reference to the primary obligor's duty to perform. The creditor, 
meanwhile, is entitled to only one performance. The Restatement of 
Suretyship scope provision, Section 1, subsection (I), casts the definition 
in different but perhaps essentially similar terms: 
( 1) [W]henever: 
(a) one person (the "principal obligor") owes performance of a 
duty (the "underlying obligation") to another party (the "obli-
gee"); and · 
(b) pursuant to contract, a third person (the "secondary obli-
gor") is subject to a "secondary obligation," whereby either: 
( 1) the secondary obligor also owes performance, in whole 
or in part, of the duty of the principal obligor to the obli-
gee; or 
(2) the obligee has recourse against the secondary obligor 
or its property: 
(i) in the event of the failure of principal obligor to 
perform the underlying obligation; or 
(ii) to protect the obligee against loss arising from po-
tential non-performance by the principal obligor; and 
114. /d. at 243. 
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(c) to the extent that the underlying obligation or the secon-
dary obligation is performed the obligee is not entitled to per-
formance of the other; and 
(d) as between the principal obligor and the secondary obligor, 
the principal obligor has a duty to perform the underlying obli-
gation or bear the cost of performance. 11 s 
The secondary obligor has suretyship status if the criteria in subsection 
(l) are satisfied. The Restatement's definition is more detailed, reading 
more like a statute, than did Section 82 of the prior Restatement of 
Security. 116 
The new Restatement definition also makes clear that suretyship is 
something that arises from the parties' relationship; it need not be cre-
ated by express contract among them. 117 The commentary to Section 1 
emphasizes further that it is the existence of interdependence that ear-
marks suretyship: "substance, rather than form determines whether 
suretyship status rights attach." 118 This also confirms that the suretyship 
concept is inextricably intertwined with conceptions of suretyship rights. 
The value of suretyship status is that it gives rise to suretyship rights, 
unless the surety has by contract or otherwise relinquished such rights. 
To similar effect: "[b]oth sureties and guarantors that fulfill the criteria 
of § 1 [interdependence] have suretyship status." 119 When three (or 
more) parties' undertakings are interdependent, there is suretyship, and, 
most significantly, suretyship status will be apposite. The secondary obli-
gor's performance responsibility will be determined by reference to the 
rights of the principal obligor and obligee pursuant to the underlying 
transaction. 
The conclusion that a transaction formulates sufficient interdepen-
dence, that one party has the suretyship rights and, concomitantly, the 
suretyship defenses, is often a post hoc judgment. When one of the three 
parties asserts a suretyship right or takes advantage of a suretyship de-
115. RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 4, § 1(1). 
116. Note the relative brevity of the Restatement of Security's definition of suretyship: "Surety-
ship is the relation which exists where one person has undertaken an obligation and another person 
is also under an obligation or other duty to the obligee, who is entitled to but one performance, and 
as between the two who are bound, one rather than the other should perform." RESTATEMENT OF 
SECURITY § 82 (1941). 
117. See RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 4, §I, cmt. a: "As the term 'suretyship 
status' suggests, the secondary obligor obtains these rights as a matter of status in the transaction 
rather than by express agreement." 
118. ld. at cmt. b; see also id. at cmt. g, entitled "Substance of contract governs; essential pur-
pose": "The determination that a contract establishing the secondary obligation gives rise to surety-
ship status is based on substance, not form." 
119. ld. at cmt. c. Note that the observation is offered in the context of discussing suretyship 
vis-a-vis guaranty, a distinction that maintains no currency in the Restatement. See id. at cmt. d: 
Sometimes the term "suretyship" is used narrowly to refer only to transactions in which one 
party is jointly and severally liable with another on an obligation and the term "guaranty" is 
used to refer to transactions in which one party is liable only after the default of the other. At 
other times, however, the term "suretyship" refers generically to both types of transactions. To 
avoid confusion . . . this Restatement avoids use of the terms "guaranty" and "surety." 
For further treatment of the issue, see id. at Reporter's Note to cmt. c and the sources cited therein. 
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fense, the party resisting that action will insist that there was not suffi-
cient interdependence to give rise to such rights or that the rights and 
defenses that flow therefrom were circumvented by the terms of the con-
tract between the putative surety and the creditor. While there are at 
least as many potential contexts in which these crucial scope issues arise 
as there are "suretyship" contracts, the important distinctions are cap-
tured in the persistent commercial law debate regarding the operation of 
the independence principle in standby letters of credit, ostensibly a two-
party relationship giving rise to the primary rather than secondary liabil-
ity of the issuer. 120 
The suretyship restatement explicitly excludes letters of credit from 
its scope: "The Restatement of this subject does not apply to obligations 
governed by the law of letters of credit." 121 The pertinent comment ex-
plains the bases of the exclusion, but in terms that are ultimately 
unconvincing: 
First, the law governing letters of credit is quite well developed, is 
generally understood to govern all letters of credit, both traditional 
and standby, and has regulated standby credits effectively and effi-
ciently. No good purpose would be served by disturbing that state 
of affairs. Second, while a standby letter of credit serves an eco-
nomic function similar to that of suretyship devices governed by this 
Restatement, it does not satisfy all of the criteria of§ 1. Under the 
independence principle governing letters of credit, performance or 
other discharge of the underlying obligation does not discharge the 
issuer of the standby letter of credit. Rather, the issuer has con-
tracted to pay upon presentation by the obligee/beneficiary of a cer-
tificate attesting to the default of the principal obligor; the issuer's 
obligation to pay is independent of whether the principal obligor has 
actually fulfilled the underlying obligation. Thus, the criterion of 
suretyship status set forth in § l(l)(c) is not satisfied and, therefore, 
the rules in this Restatement do not apply to letters of credit. 122 
The Restatement excludes letters of credit because the representatives of 
issuer interests do not want letters of credit to be within the scope of the 
Restatement, not because of any fundamental difference between standby 
credits and suretyship. If standby credits are deemed interdependent, 
and subject to suretyship principles, the issuer that pays notwithstanding 
the account party's fraud defense will not be able to obtain or retain re-
imbursement from the account party and will be left with only a cause of 
120. The law of commercial paper also draws a distinction between the primary liability of 
makers and acceptors and the secondary liability of indorsers and accommodation parties. See 
U.C.C. §§ 3-413 ("Contract of Maker, Drawer and Acceptor"), 3-414 ("Contract of Indorser; Or-
der of Liability") & 3-415 ("Contract of Accommodation Party") (1989); and U.C.C. §§ 3-412 
("Obligation of Issuer of Note or Cashier's Check"), 3-413 ("Obligation of Acceptor") & 3-415 
("Obligation of Indorser") (revised 1990). 
121. RESTATEMENT Of SURETYSHIP, supra note 4, § 3(2). 
122. /d. § 3 cmt. b; see id. § 1(1)(c) ("A 'secondary obligor' has suretyship status whenever . .. 
to the extent that the underlying obligation or the secondary obligation is performed the obligee is 
not entitled to performance of the other"). 
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action against the fraud-feasor beneficiary. This is precisely the circum-
stance issuers want to avoid by excluding standby credits from the scope 
of suretyship. 
The "exclusion" of credits in § l(l)(c) is conclusory rather than ex-
planatory: if the courts or the governing law in fact deemed the issuer's 
undertaking in standby credit transactions to be independent of the ac-
count party's duty to perform, then it would be correct to conclude that 
the two-party nature of credits is distinguishable and distinct from the 
three-party basis of suretyship. But cases construing the parties' under-
taking in standby credit transactions when the account party alleges 
fraud confirm that credits are, in practice, three-party devices, albeit a 
unique form of three-party arrangements. As review of the extant credit 
enhancement devices reveals, however, each is unique in an important 
way. This, however, should not and does not obscure their fundamental 
affinity. Recall also that the parties are free to adjust the terms of their 
agreement to effect a two-party-like result, without such contractual ad-
justments' removing the device from the scope of the suretyship restate-
ment. Indeed, the Restatement acknowledges that freedom of contract: 
[T]he secondary obligor has suretyship status: 
(a) regardless of the form of the transaction fulfilling the crite-
ria [of§ 1(1)]; 
(b) regardless of any term used by the parties to describe the 
secondary obligor or the secondary obligation; 
(c) whether the secondary obligation is conditional or 
unconditional; 
(d) whether or not the secondary obligation is known to the 
principal obligor; and 
(e) whether or not the obligee has notice that the secondary 
obligor has suretyship status. 123 
If typical commercial guaranty agreements, absolute in their terms and 
containing comprehensive waivers of any rights that the guarantor inter-
poses, may be within the scope of the Restatement notwithstanding their 
two-party-like nature, it is difficult to discern a reasoned basis for exclud-
ing letters of credit if, in fact, the independence of the issuer's undertak-
ing is more aspiration than actuality. 
It is appropriate here to conjecture about commercial interests that 
issue letters of credit to benefit from keeping standby credits outside the 
scope of the Restatement. Keep in mind that the issuer of a credit is akin 
to the secondary obligor, bound to perform on the beneficiary/obligee's 
demand, subject, perhaps, to the account party's interposition of a de-
fense good against the beneficiary, namely fraud. Those same institutions 
123. /d. § 1(2); see id. § 12(c), which states: 
[I]f the parties to a contract identify one party as a .. surety," or the contract as a "suretyship" 
contract, the party so identified is a secondary obligor who is subject to a secondary obligation 
pursuant to which the secondary obligor is jointly and severally liable with the principal obligor 
to perform the obligation set forth in that contract. 
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that issue standby credits, multinational banks, often take guaranty 
agreements as collateral security supporting loans that those same banks 
have made to borrowers/principal obligors. With regard to those finan-
cial institutions' rights as obligees in the commercial guaranty agreement 
context, their interests are best served by a body of legal principles favor-
ing obligees over secondary obligors. But insofar as those same institu-
tions are issuers of standby credits, akin to secondary obligors, they 
would prefer that a body of law proceeding from the opposite predisposi-
tion, favoring issuers/secondary obligors, provide the rules of decision. 
Article 5 of the U. C C can serve the interests of large institutional 
creditors as issuers and the Restatement of Suretyship can serve the inter-
ests of those same institutions as obligees; but having one comprehensive 
body of law serving those institutions' interests in both roles at the same 
time would be difficult. It is much easier to divide and conquer. And 
that is true whether or not the division is effected with the intent to con-
quer. Intentional or not, principle is manipulated. 
In the recent revision of Uniform Commercial Code Article 3, 
"Commercial Paper,"124 the suretyship rules implicated in transactions 
involving negotiable instruments were changed dramatically from their 
original form. Original Article 3125 generally followed existing surety-
ship rules regarding the undertaking of an accommodation party. 126 Re-
vised Section 3-605, however, departs from the common law of 
suretyship in order to better serve the interests of holders of accommo-
dated paper, generally sophisticated financial institutions. 127 While the 
wisdom of those adjustments may be controversial, for present purposes 
it suffices to note that the scope of the suretyship restatement includes 
negotiable instruments. 128 The Restatement provides· that Article 3 gov-
erns when the Restatement and that statute collide, certainly a gratuitous 
provision, insofar as statutes always govern the common law. 129 None-
theless, the Restatement accommodates the statutory. commercial paper 
law without pretending that accommodation of a negotiable instrument 
is not an instance of suretyship. Why should letters of credit be treated 
any differently? ' 
If the undertaking of an accommodation party on a negotiable in-
strument is suretyship, yet excepted from the Restatement rules, then it 
124. U.C.C. art. 3 (revised 1990). 
125. u.c.c. § 3-606 (1989). 
126. See generally Neil B. Cohen, Suretyship Principles in the New Article 3: Clarifications and 
Substantive Changes, 42 ALA. L. REV. 595 (1991); Ellen A. Peters, Suretyship Under Article 3 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 833 (1968). 
127. See U.C.C. § 3-605 & cmts. 2-5 (revised 1990). See generally Cohen, supra note 126. 
128. The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code has circulated for com-
ment a proposed "PEB Commentary on the Uniform Commercial Code Concerning Suretyship Is-
sues Under Sections 3-116, 3·305, 3-415, 3-419, and 3-605" (Proposed Final Draft, May 20, 1993). 
129. RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 4, § 3(1): "When a transaction resulting in a 
person having suretyship status is governed by the Jaw of negotiable instruments (Article 3 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code}, that law takes precedence over otherwise applicable rules in this 
Restatement." 
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would seem that the Restatement rules would be apposite, if the paper 
accommodated is determined by a court not to be negotiable. 130 This is 
true even though the instrument may be deemed not negotiable for rea-
sons wholly unrelated to suretyship principles. 131 
The same result would not prevail with regard to a letter of credit 
once the court decides that the independence of the credit is undermined. 
Then, notwithstanding the type of interdependent arrangement that is 
the hallmark of suretyship, the Restatement would be inapposite, at least 
to the extent displaced by Article 5. This is particularly curious consid-
ering that the circumstance that will result in the destruction of indepen-
dence, fraud, is the very circumstance that provides the basis for the 
application of suretyship rights and defenses. This anomaly is the prod-
uct of the Restatement's unprincipled separation of letters of credit from 
the scope of suretyship. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In determining the nature of three-party rights, commercial con-
tracts law distinguishes two-party from three-party arrangements. The 
suretyship restatement, concerning ostensibly three-party obligations, ex-
pressly excepts from its scope certain contracts-letters of credit which 
assume the incidents of a two-party undertaking. But it is clear from a 
survey of the commercial credit enhancement devices that many com-
mercial agreements that are within the scope of the Restatement may 
nonetheless bear the indicia of a two-party transaction that the parties to 
standby credits intend for their relationship. Furthermore, review of the 
letter of credit cases reveals that many standbys, either by their own 
terms or the reviewing courts' insinuation of fraud principles, are, essen-
tially, three-party, interdependent relationships. Therefore, not only 
does the two-party/three-party dichotomy obscure commercial realities, 
it distorts principle. 
While it would be overrefined to mourn the sacrifice of principle 
merely as some type of affront to jurisprudential symmetry, there is more 
at stake in the Restatement of Suretyship and the revision of Article 5 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code. Perhaps (and probably) unwittingly, the 
two- vs. three-party fiction vindicates the interests of those commercial 
130. The elements of negotiability are formulated in original and revised U.C.C. § 3-104. Pro-
fessor Cohen has also opined that the Restatement would apply to supplement Article 3 of the 
U. C. C. in cases in which the Code does not dis positively provide a governing rule. See Cohen, supra 
note 126, at 619: 
With the exception of revised section 3-605(f), the U.C.C. does not provide rules governing 
suretyship defenses of parties who are sureties but not accommodation parties [i.e., true co-
makers]. A strong case can therefore be made that such parties are protected by the common 
law of suretyship. The common law, of course, can be imported by application of U.C.C. sec-
tion 1-103. 
131. For example, an instrument will not be negotiable if it lacks the " words of negotiability," 
viz. "payable to order or bearer." See U.C.C. § 3-104(l)(d) (1989) & U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(l) (revised 
1990). 
No.3) THE SURETYSHIP PRINCIPLE 483 
transactors who are sometimes suretyship obligees and, at other times, 
standby credit issuers. Normative balance and transactional integrity 
only can be maintained in the commercial law if restatements of the law 
and uniform commercial law are formulated along lines dictated by prin-
ciple: if the authors of such initiatives are not attentive to principle, they 
compromise immanent justice. 
In the case of the suretyship restatement, the consequences of inat-
tention to principle loom large on the horizon. It is quite possible that 
the Restatement project will be followed by a new Article 3A of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, concerning commercial suretyship. 132 If the Re-
statement excludes from its scope, on the basis of some asserted but 
insubstantial rationale, 133 letters of credit, then the fit between an Article 
3A and a revised Article 5 will be uneasy, perhaps untenable. And if the 
new Article 3A is inconsistent with the Restatement, then that disso-
nance will undermine the efficacy of both. 
The definition of suretyship offered in this article is sufficiently com-
prehensive to include both standby credits and the other common credit 
enhancement devices; any coherent definition of suretyship must. The 
graphic demonstration of the interrelated considerations in fixing the 
terms of the two-party/three-party standby credit dynamic complements 
the proposed definition. Furthermore, there is no chance that the defini-
tion's breadth will impair the rights of the parties to three-party relation-
ships to fix their rights inter se by contract, subject, of course, to the 
irresistible power of fraud to "unravel[] everything."134 
132. See Letter from Donald J. Rapson, General Counsel, CIT Corporation, and member of the 
Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code as well as Adviser to the Restatement 
of Suretyship to Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Professor, Yale Law School, and Director of the American 
Law Institute 1 (May 30, 1986) in Appendix A to Donald J. Rapson, History and Background of the 
Restatement of Suretyship, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 1013 (1993) ("recommending an [Ameri-
can Law Institute] study of the law of suretyship with a view to (1) having a Restatement of the Law 
of Security 2d and (2) reviewing and expanding the suretyship rules in the Uniform Commercial 
Code-possibly in a new Article"). 
133. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text. 
134. JOHN M. FJNNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 288 (1980). 
